TURKMEN IN IRAQ AND THEIR FLIGHT: A DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTION

IRAK'TAKİ TÜRKMENLER VE GÖÇLERİ: BİR DEMOGRAFİ SORUNU

التركمان في العراق وهجراتهم : مشكلة ديموغرافية

CENTER FOR MIDDLE EASTERN STRATEGIC STUDIES

ORSAM

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CENTER FOR MIDDLE EASTERN STRATEGIC STUDIES

History

In Turkey, the shortage of research on the Middle East grew more conspicuous than ever during the early 90's. Center for Middle Eastern Strategic Studies (ORSAM) was established in January 1, 2009 in order to provide relevant information to the general public and to the foreign policy community. The institute underwent an intensive structuring process, beginning to concentrate exclusively on Middle Eastern affairs.

Outlook on the Middle Eastern World

It is certain that the Middle East harbors a variety of interconnected problems. However, neither the Middle East nor its people ought to be stigmatized by images with negative connotations. Given the strength of their populations, Middle Eastern states possess the potential to activate their inner dynamics in order to begin peaceful mobilizations for development. Respect for people's willingness to live together, respect for the sovereign rights of states and respect for basic human rights and individual freedoms are the prerequisites for assuring peace and tranquility, both domestically and internationally. In this context, Turkey must continue to make constructive contributions to the establishment of regional stability and prosperity in its vicinity.

ORSAM's Think-Tank Research

ORSAM, provides the general public and decision-making organizations with enlightening information about international politics in order to promote a healthier understanding of international policy issues and to help them to adopt appropriate positions. In order to present effective solutions, ORSAM supports high quality research by intellectuals and researchers that are competent in a variety of disciplines. ORSAM's strong publishing capacity transmits meticulous analyses of regional developments and trends to the interested parties. With its web site, its books, reports, and periodicals, ORSAM supports the development of Middle Eastern literature on a national and international scale. ORSAM facilitates the sharing of knowledge and ideas with the Turkish and international communities by inviting statesmen, bureaucrats, academics, strategists, businessmen, journalists and NGO representatives to Turkey.

List of Tables

List of Figures

Iraq

TURKEY

Diyarbakir
Batman
Kurtalan
Şanlıurfa
Cizre
Hakkâri
Orūmīyeh
Tabrīz
Lake Urmia
Marāgheh
Miāneh
Zanjān

Al Qāmishlī
Zakho
DAHŪK
Dahūk
ʿAqrah
Rāyāt
Mahābād
Saqqez
Sanandaj

Al Ḩasakah
Tall Ḩuqnah
Sinjār
Mosul
Buḩayrat Dahūk
ARBIL
Irbīl
Qalʿat Dizah
Great Zab

SYRIA

Dayr az Zawr
NĪNAWÁ
Karkūk
AT TAMĪM
Little Zab
AS SULAYMĀNĪYAH
As Sulaymānīyah
Halabjah

IRAN

Al Qāʿim
Bayjī
Buḩayrat al Qadisīyah
Tikrīt
SALĀḨ AD DĪN
Sāmarrāʾ
Tigris
Khānaqīn
DIYĀLĀ
Nahr Diyālá
Hamadān
Bākhtarān

Hadīthah
Akāshāt
Buḩayrat ath Tharthār
Baʿqūbah
Mandalī
Īlām
Khorramābād
Borūjerd

Ar Ramādī
Al Fallūjah
Baghdad
BAGHDĀD

AL ANBĀR
Al Ḩabbānīyah
Buḩayrat al Ḩabbānīyah
WĀSIT
Al Kūt
Dezfūl

Ar Rutbah
Bahr al Milḩ
Karbalāʾ
BĀBIL
Al Hillah
Al Hindīyah
Ad Dīwānīyah
Al Hayy

De Facto Boundary
KARBALĀʾ
An Nukhayb
An Najaf
AL QĀDISĪYAH
MAYSĀN
Al ʿAmārah
Ahvāz

JORDAN

Arʿar
AN NAJAF
As Samāwah
An Nāşirīyah
DHĪ QĀR

As Salmān
AL MUTHANNÁ
Al Buşayyah
Az Zubayr
AL BASRAH
Al Başrah
Khorramshahr
Ābādān
Umm Qaşr
Al Fāw
Shatt al Arab

Rafḩāʾ

Persian Gulf

KUWAIT
Al Jahrah
Kuwait

SAUDI ARABIA
Ḩafar al Bāţin
Raʾs al Khafjī
Wādī al Bāţin

Legend

— International boundary
—·—·— Province (muḩāfaẓah) boundary
★ National capital
◉ Province (muḩāfaẓah) capital
— Expressway
— Road
—+—+— Railroad

0   50   100 Kilometers
0   50   100 Miles

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Preface

The invasion of Iraq has aggravated ethnic and minority issues in the country. Like most other countries in the region, Iraq accommodates multiple ethnic and religious groups each of which has claims often clashing with the others. Perhaps most known of such conflicts revolves around the Kurdish claims. Nevertheless, these conflicts have roots going back to early 20th century and perhaps even further back. Turkmen in Iraq have been a great concern for successive Turkish governments and thus often influenced Turkey's international politics and affairs.

In this complex web of relations and interests over the Middle East, demography is often part of the problem as well as the solution. Population engineering is not unknown to nations across the globe, but perhaps in the second half of the last century, Iraqi minorities saw one of the most brutal treatments amounting to ethnic cleansing. The Kurds, as the largest ethnic minority in Iraq suffered terribly from Saddam's cruelty over decades and mass killings attracted world's attention to an extent. Turkmen and the other minorities in Iraq, despite being sizeable, have not attracted much interest from the international public. Nevertheless, they had suffered from the same ethnic cleansing policies.

In the new Iraq, by the recipes of the US and the allies, major ethnic and religious groups gained some remarkable representation. Single party nature of Iraqi politics turned into a largely fragmented wonderland of religious and ethnic parties. Again smaller groups such as Turkmen and Assyrians were not lucky enough to get proportionate representation and often joined in other groups. However, the dispute over Kirkuk and oil reserves in the North, in a way, brings Turkmen back on the agenda. This is perhaps largely due to Turkey's excessive emphasis on Turkmen and Kurdish issue in Iraq.

Analysing Turkmen population movements was an interesting task for two reasons: First, due to their relatively small population size was making Turkmen disadvantaged against Arabs and Kurds and so far in restructuring Iraq, we have seen evidence that they suffer from representation problems. Secondly, as a case, it offers opportunities to understand and prepare for similar conflict situations and minority issues involved in such conflicts. This research was conceived in reaction to the chaos and turbulence in Iraq following the invasion by the USA and coalition forces in 2003.

The two surveys forming the basis for this book were conducted in 2004. We have surveyed about 1500 households in selected cities and towns of Iraq including Baghdad, Kirkuk, Musul and Erbil. To understand the receiving end of the migration process, we have also conducted a questionnaire survey simultaneously in Turkey targeting Iraqi Turkmen immigrants in major cities including Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir. For neither of the surveys, we can claim representativeness due to absence of any population frames from which we can draw samples. However, the two surveys provided a rich data set which is at least useful for a better understanding of Turkmen international migration patterns and experiences.

Thus in this book, we aimed to offer a comprehensive account of Iraqi Turkmen international migration at the turn of the century. Given there are no other studies on Iraqi Turkmen, this study is also the first ever analysis of this particular population and presents some broader socioeconomic characteristics. A chapter based on a first ever analysis of Iraqi migration is also added to complete the picture and place the Turkmen case in its country context.

These surveys, analysis and eventually this publication was only possible with the assistance of certain key people and an organised effort of over 60 field workers and logistic support of others. Of course, I am first of all grateful to all those Turkmen in Iraq and Turkey who not only spared their time to answer our questions and helped us to locate other respondents. Personally, I would like to thank to all those who generously supported this study and all voluntary Turkmen students who worked for the project and went to Iraq and travelled several cities to conduct face to face interviews with Turkmen families.

İbrahim Sirkeci
2010, London

Presentation

Iraq is a country in which *population engineering* on regard to her ethnic and sectarian groups was carried out comprehensively with pitiless brutality. In fact, the dire results of policies ran by oppressive regimes now converge with the issues that emerged following the U.S. occupation in 2003. Irak is struggling for existence amidst problems caused by domestic and transborder migration. One of the main issues overshadowing Iraq both today and in the future is without any doubt migration. Furthermore, the unclear status of Iraqi refugees in their neigboring countries is another issue which must be discussed. Hereby a solution in the medium or long-term seems to be costly and difficult to achieve.

We, as ORSAM, make efforts to reflect about the latest period of a crisis-ridden Iraq with a special focus on the dynamics prevalent on a domestic level. On this regard, we previously published two studies, one discussing the presence of Turkmen presence in Turkey and the other one migration from Iraq to her neighbouring countries, in particular Turkey. With this new report we want to shed light on new aspects.

This authentic study, worked out by Prof. Dr. Ibrahim Sirkeci, a world-renowned scholar in the fields of sectarian dissocation, segmentation, conflict and migration, is in many ways exemplary. Sirkeci's study on the experiences of Turkmen immigrants is by far the most comprehensive work on this topic in the academic field. On this occassion we would like to express our deep gratitude to himself.

The information used by Sirkeci throughout his studies will undoubtly increase the credibility of his appraisals. The author, on the one hand providing us with a vast amount of helpful information to enhance our understanding on international migration of Turkmens, on the other hand delineates an overall image of Iraq, as he also discusses Turkmens within the domestic context.

According to Sirkeci, one of the valorizing aspects of his work is the special focus on the feeling shared by Turkmens – the pressure to migrate. If we take into account the uncertainity, which is likely to increase in the following years, we expect an increased number of Turkmens to leave their homes in case sectarian peace cannot be achieved. For there is not doubt that, due to this process, not only Turkmens but also Iraq herself, being deprived of its rich human capital, will be at loss.

Finally, we would like to express that we will continue our studies on the migration issue in Iraq in the following term and are open to all kind of recommendations from your side.

With Best Regards,

Hasan KANBOLAT

Director

By Dr. İbrahim Sirkeci
Reader in Demography and Marketing
Regent's College, London, UK

TURKMEN IN IRAQ AND THEIR FLIGHT: A DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTION

Executive Summary

Ethnic and religious conflicts, power struggles and wars have determined and shaped the fate of contemporary Iraq throughout the second half of the last century and into the new millennium. These conflicts have largely prevented the collection of data and therefore healthy analysis of the country's demography for a long while. The demographic engineering took place during the Baath regime and perhaps still in progress in the country is one key reason why the international community as well as Iraqis themselves do not know for sure what the country is made of, ethnically and religiously. Therefore all studies and reports on Iraq are based on partial data which can be controversial as there is practically no reliable population frame from which anybody can draw representative samples or test the representativeness. The two surveys forming the basis of this book/report are also not free from that potential fallacy. However, given the paucity of data and analysis from war torn Iraq, every little research helps a great deal to understand population dynamics in the country and possibly inform the national and international policy choices.

The two international migration surveys were conducted in Iraq and Turkey respectively. The one conducted in Iraq targeted Iraqi Turkmen households in major cities and towns in the North and Bagdad. The chosen areas where sizeable Turkmen populations exist were surveyed by a random sampling method employed in the field. Although 1500 households were aimed to reach, our field teams were only able to complete questionnaires in a total of 1040 households. About one third of the households were identified as migrant households where at least a member of the household is a migrant or was once a migrant. This is a far higher figure than in many traditional migrant sending countries.

The second survey was carried out almost simultaneously in major cities in Turkey, again by considering where large Turkmen immigrant communities exist. A total of 161 questionnaires were completed most of whom were randomly selected from Iraqi Turkmen Front registers while convenience sampling was used to reach respondents in Istanbul.

In line with my conflict model of migration, Iraqi Turkmen migration is following a pattern that corresponds to lows and peaks of various conflicts and degree of intensity of conflict in Iraq over the time. Turkmen's perception of relative security in Turkey and other destination countries in comparison to relative insecurity in Iraq is the key driver in their international migration experiences. Apparently background variables such as age, gender, income, education and employment are all playing their part in the decision making. Nevertheless, the wars Iraqis have faced and suffered from during the last two or three decades drew the line between moving and not moving as well as deciding when to move. The largest portion of outmigration took place after 1990.

It was found that Turkmen is a well-educated population with a high tendency to move abroad, particularly to Turkey due to historical and cultural ties. Possibly in response to the tightening immigration admission regimes across the board, as many as 50 per cent of all Turkmen migrants crossed borders without necessary papers or overstayed their permits and visas.

This study presents a story of an unsettled minority population in Iraq and indicates high emigration pressures felt by Turkmen. Given the current uncertainty prevailing in Iraq, one would expect many more have left since our fieldwork and many more are likely to flee their homes in the future unless a multi-ethnic peace is secured in the country.

Introduction: The Turkmen Question in Iraq

Immediately after the invasion of Iraq in March 2003, as an international migration researcher, I was concerned about the potential repercussions of this military move for international migration in Iraq. The available data from international organisations were already showing that the First Gulf War had caused a shift in Iraq's migration profile: the country had switched from a country of immigration hosting millions of contract workers and refugees into a country of emigration seeing many of its citizens fleeing. In an earlier study, I have documented emigration trends from Iraq[1] and presented it with an environment of insecurity perspective which was developed to explain ethnic tensions initially and later was developed to be applied in international migration cases[2]. The 2003 invasion did not help much to alleviate the environment of insecurity which is a key driver for emigration from Iraq. Since the invasion living conditions in Iraq are severed and millions of Iraqis are internally and internationally displaced. In this book, I am discussing the international side of this displacement with a particular focus on the experiences of Turkmen population.

Insecurity in Iraq and securitisation of migration discourse in general are two faces of today's international migration from Iraq. A sizeable population of Iraqis left Iraq for European destinations and many settled in or still waiting in limbo (i.e. asylum seekers and undocumented migrants). Given the tightening admission rules and European obsession with immigration control, we can predict many Iraqis to be among illegal migrants as well as many among those who lost their lives in attempting crossing in the European borderlands. These borderland casualties should be seen as another aspect of human insecurity for Iraqis who happened to be destined to Europe for security.

During the 1990s and early 2000s, Iraqi emigration was more of a steady flow of people avoiding the dangers of a shattering country. With the 2003 invasion, we have seen mass influxes into neighbouring countries, flight of huge number of Iraqis. Middle East was not strange to any such mass movements. Saddam Hussein's attack on Kurds had killed thousands and forced hundreds of thousands to flee into neighbouring Turkey. Starting from 1948 War resulting in the displacement of 700,000 Palestinians[3], till the summer 2006 Israeli attack on Lebanon, the region saw millions of people displaced and many left uprooted for decades (e.g. Palestinians in Syria and Jordan). The first Gulf War had forced about 2 million immigrants to leave Iraq[4]. Alongside immigrants, many Iraqis also fled the country at the time. Today, estimates tally that over 4.5 million Iraqis are displaced within and outside Iraq as a result of the 2003 invasion and violence in the aftermath. Turkmen in Iraq also had their share in these mass displacements.

Iraq, similar to other nations in the Middle

East, is made up of different ethnic and religious groups. Major ones in its mix are Sunnis and Shiites on the religious axis and Arabs, Kurds, and Turkmen on the ethnic axis. There are no statistics we can rely on and confidently estimate the Turkmen population in contemporary Iraq. Two key reasons for this are the Arabisation policies –and nationality correction forms used in 1997 – and continuing wars and conflicts the country faced through several decades[5]. When I first developed an interest in Iraqi population, it was quite a surprise for me to find out that there were very few studies on Iraqi population in the English literature[6]. Paucity of reliable data leaves the researchers and policy makers dependent on the data collected by other countries.[7] Alternative is conducting surveys which are often limited by small budgets and other practical barriers (e.g. war in Iraq). Nevertheless, I was able to conduct the two surveys which are the basis of this book.

Turkmen population is particularly interesting for their relative position and share within the Iraqi balance of ethnic relations. On the one hand there is competition between long oppressed Shiites and governing Sunnis while on the other the Kurds are trying to gain as much control as possible in the new Iraq. Turkmen mostly live in and around the Kurdish controlled or dominated areas in the north of Iraq and their future is therefore tightly connected to that of the Kurds. Thus there is also the influence of Turkey. Turkey has been concerned about the future of Kurds and the Northern Iraq in reference to potential spill over effects. Due to their ethnic Turkish belonging, Turkmen is also an issue for Turkish foreign policy. Within the power struggles of Iraq, this smallest of the largest minorities in Iraq becomes also a litmus paper to measure the minority rights in the new Iraq. Therefore it is important to understand Turkmen migration trends and relevance of insecurity to Turkmen's move. The relationship between international migration and conflict is a well-known one for the students of migration field[8]. It has grown into

almost a sub-discipline, that of forced migration studies. In multiethnic populations, ethnic groups are likely to be effected by the conflict situations unevenly. Such an uneven suffering may also be the cause for out-migration as a survival strategy. This is what led me to study Turkmen migration from Iraq.

In these two surveys, I have aimed at identifying patterns of Turkmen international migration. In the following chapters, I am going to present the research setting first. Then I will elaborate on the conceptual model explaining international mobility using conflict and environment of insecurity. The following two chapters will analyse Iraq as an environment of insecurity and present patterns of international migration from Iraq. Finally, the two later chapters are introducing the results of the two surveys while elaborating overall migration patterns of Turkmen and contrasting it with Turkmen immigrants in Turkey. To complete this introduction, in the following passages, I will briefly summarise the Turkmen population and population figure contest in Iraq.

Oil-rich regions of Iraq are mainly around Basra in the south and Kirkuk in the north and these areas populated by Shiites, and the Kurds and Turkmen, respectively. In these areas, Iraqi governments over decades followed a systematic "Arabisation" policy aimed to erase all non-Arab presence by Arabising all aspects of life including the refusal of registration of new born babies with non-Arabic names[9]. This genocidal policy of Iraq dates back to the 1920s and the 1930s when Iraq was under the British mandate[10]. Successive Iraqi governments have systematically resettled Arab tribes in the surrounding region of Kirkuk[11]. As a result of Arabisation for decades, many Turkmen were forced either to resign from their ethnicity and or to leave the territory. Thus many are expected to have fled abroad. Those Arabised by Ba'ath regime may reclaim their true ethnicity when the opportunity arises"[12]. Nevertheless, as a smaller minority, it seems Turkmen are also in

danger of a potential Kurdification in the new era following the toppling of Saddam Hussein as the Kurdish groups have gained strength disproportionate to their share in the population. However, no authority can claim what are the proportions given there is no census or registry available.

There is very limited data on Iraq's population. The population of the country has increased from 12.9 million in 1980, to 17.3 million in 1990, and to 24.7 million in 2003, which indicates a population growth rate of about 3%.[13] This is very high in comparison with European and North American countries, as the statistics reveal the population growth rate in Iraq was 2.78 between 1995 and 2000, whereas it was 0.02 for Europe, 1.07 for North America, and 1.35 for the whole world (1.35 globally).[14] A striking contrast revealed within the existing data is that 42 percent of the entire Iraqi population is under 14, as compared to 21.5% in North America, and 17.5 in Europe.[15]

As with all minorities in Iraq, the size of the community is burdened with controversy. Most international sources indicate a population of around half a million for Turkmen, whilst Turkmen resources claim their population to be about 1.5 to 3 million.[16] According to the last census in Iraq when Turkmen were allowed to register themselves as Turkmen in 1957, there were 567,000 Turkmen (about 9%) among 6.3 million Iraqis.[17] Today, Iraqi Turkmen Front (ITF) suggests a figure of about 3 million Turkmen in Iraq (13 per cent of the Iraqi population). Turkmen People's Party estimates that Turkmen, the third largest ethnic group in the country, constitute about 10-13 per cent of the total, which is also considered as a realistic figure by Iraqi Turkmen Front[18]. Another group named Turkmen Cultural Association (TCA) presents a much smaller number: one million Turkmen.[19] The head of the Islamic Union of Iraqi Turkmen based in Damascus, Abbas Bayati, pronounced a figure between 1.5 and 2 million for Turkmen in Iraq.[20] Ac-

cording to CIA, Turkmen and other smaller groups are shown smaller down to 5 percent whereas Arabs are estimated to comprise three quarters, while Kurds are one in six.[21] However these figures are far from being accurate as nobody can verify them. It is also important to recognise that almost every single ethnic group accommodates Sunni and Shiite segments. Therefore researchers and other publics need to be cautious of the fact that such ethnic or religious boundaries are often crossed. Unless a proper and fair population census is conducted in Iraq, this contest over population shares will stay. Any such referendum will also show us the outcome of decades long ethnic cleansing and resulting population displacements.

Chasing the Turkmen: The Two Surveys in the Aftermath of 2003 Invasion

Studying ethnic minority populations is always a challenge because of the paucity of data on ethnic breakdown of national populations. In censuses and other registration systems, often groups are often identified by citizenship categories and mainly for political choices ethnic or religious categories are not used. Iraq has not been free from this. Iraqi censuses present huge variations in ethnic group populations. However, any census is in a way, "a pragmatically-designed instrument for collecting policy-relevant statistical data"[22] and the categories used in any census are politically loaded[23]. Thus censuses are politically designed and affect the politics. Manipulation of censuses and group categories used in them become more of an issue when policies are set to create entitlements based on race, ethnicity, religion, and so on. Examples can be found in both developing and developed countries[24]. This makes censuses always a difficult issue to hold consensus. Census in Iraq has been on the agenda since the invasion and yet, after almost 23 years since the last census, the country has postponed the nationwide population census indefinitely "over fears it could stoke ethnic and political tensions"[25]. This leaves the arguments over the size of re-

ligious and ethnic groups in Iraq alive. These fears and delays of a census are closely linked to the dispute over oil-rich Kirkuk where Arabs, Kurds and Turkmen have incompatible claims. Absence of reliable data on population segments in Iraq is a huge drawback for any demographic analysis and therefore independent surveys are ever more important and crucial in understanding and addressing social and political problems in today's Iraq. Nevertheless, because most registers in other countries, studying Iraqi Turkmen diaspora was also not possible without a custom independent survey.

In this study, we have collected information through two surveys. The first survey we have conducted in Iraq employed a randomized sample of Iraqi Turkmen living in a number of cities in Iraq while the second survey was carried out in major cities in Turkey used convenience sampling. Therefore, we cannot claim these two survey samples of being representative of overall Turkmen population in Iraq or Iraqi Turkmen diaspora community in Turkey. However, both surveys provide us a rich array of information that may help a better understanding of their demographics and processes of international mobility among Iraqi Turkmen. I believe this represents largely the best option particularly when one considers that these surveys were conducted in 2004, within a year of the 2003 invasion which uprooted about 5 million Iraqis and caused a death tally over a million.

International Migration Survey in Iraq

Following a preparation period, 40 interviewers were trained to administer a four-module questionnaire to about 1400 randomly selected Iraqi Turkmen households in selected cities and towns in Iraq where a sizeable Turkmen population is expected to exist according to the past census results, literature and also on the basis of interviews made with key informants from the Iraqi Turkmen community in Turkey. Accordingly cities and towns of Altunkopru,

Baghdad, Besir, Dakuk, Erbil, Hanekin, Kirkuk, Musul, Suleymaniye, Taze, Telafer, Tuz, and Zeynelabidin were selected. However, it had not been possible under the current conditions in Iraq to complete all interviews as initially planned. As a result, some areas had to be excluded due to high insecurity. Then our final sample size was reduced to 1040 households accommodating 5986 individuals (2992 females and 2994 males) in 12 cities and towns instead of initially planned 1500 households.

In every town and city three districts were selected randomly and within each selected district one street was randomly selected by the fieldworkers. Interviewers were sent to contact and conduct face to face interviews with 15 Turkmen households from each selected street. The method to select Turkmen households was visiting houses beginning with the first house (by door number) in the street until finding a Turkmen household and continuing the same procedure till completing 15 interviews. Interviewers were allowed to ask help from these initial Turkmen households to identify other Turkmen households in areas they are required to conduct interviews. If the street accommodates too few households, the interviewers are required to proceed to the next street on the right or left until the set number of interviews in any selected area is completed. To facilitate the process, whenever possible we have sent interviewers to the areas they are originally from or to the areas they are familiar with.

The questionnaire was designed to collect information on the households' background characteristics including the size, living conditions, employment and education status of members, relative wealth and living standard compared to others living in the same area, migration experiences of household members, if there is any, migrant's decision making processes and factors influencing migration decision, along with the information about migration experiences of communities of which the household members are a part. Module A covered the

background characteristics of key respondent from household, while Module B and D were about household features including size of household, living conditions, quality of the living environment, cultural features such as religion and language, and values of household members. Module C was about characteristics and experiences of migrants themselves. Obviously due to the nature of international migration, it was not possible to find migrant actor to answer questions except in very few cases in which migrants were luckily visiting their families back home. In other cases, proxy respondents were used to collect information about the experiences of migrants.

General Characteristics of the Survey Population: Turkmen in Iraq

We have conducted face to face interviews with 1095 respondents in Iraqi Turkmen households which generated 1040 completed questionnaires. Age and gender breakdown of these res-

pondents are presented in Figure 1. With these interviews, the total number of household members covered was 5986 composed of 2992 females and 2994 males as displayed in figure 2. As the key respondents were often heads of households, overall the majority of them were older than 35 at the time of interviews.

When we look at the population of household members, almost three quarters of respondents were household heads including 15 percent women. Unless the actual migrant is available, these key respondents were used as proxy to answer questions about migration experiences in module C of the survey questionnaire. 36 percent of households were reported to have at least one member who ever migrated abroad. These households are classified as "migrant households" in this study.

As the figures one and two above shows that the age and gender distributions were almost identical for males and females among house-

**Figure 1: Age and Gender Structure of Respondents, Survey in Iraq**

Figure 2: Age and Gender of Household Members, Survey in Iraq

hold heads and household members. The largest group among household members were those aged between 20 and 45 while it was between 45 and 54 amongst the key respondents (i.e. household heads). 23 percent of respondents were women whilst 20 percent was never married as opposed to 76 percent married and 4 percent divorcees, separates and widows.

International Migration Survey in Turkey: Turkmen Diaspora

There was no previous study conducted on Turkmen immigrants in Turkey and there was no population framework from which we could have drawn a representative sample for this immigrant group. Nevertheless, we have done our best to reach a population that will at least reflect the variety among the diaspora community. Also practical and budgetary restrictions were of concern. Thus we have selected Ankara where the supporting institution and the research team were both based. Selection of Turkey was because in the field study in Iraq, it appeared that Turkey was the most popular destination for Turkmen. This was the case possibly both because of geographical proximity and

of cultural proximity. Second city we have selected to collect data was Istanbul, the largest city in Turkey and accommodates the largest immigrant population in the country. Therefore we have expected a sizeable community of Turkmen would be found in these two cities.

The only list we had access was the records of Iraqi Turkmen Front (ITF) office in Ankara. This is clearly not the perfect sampling frame and possibly biased. Nevertheless, this was the only option available at the time of this study. The list is known to suffer from the fact that many Turkmen immigrants in Turkey were not registered despite the fact that they often needed to register with ITF for their legal affairs in Turkey such as police registration.

We have completed 133 questionnaires with 175 respondents who were randomly selected from the ITF list. Age and gender breakdown of these respondents are displayed in the figure below. Among the respondents, the majority were married for both gender groups.

We have also interviewed another group of 28 respondents in Istanbul where we have emplo-

yed a convenience sampling method. The questionnaires were completed through regular visits to the Turkmen Cultural Association in their downtown office.

The selection of samples through Turkmen organisations was methodologically unsafe but given the fact that we are interested in reflection rather than representation and in the absence of any useful population frame to draw a random sample, this was the only viable option. Another problem with the sample was the domination of males (90 percent of the total) but it is in line with the migration studies literature as migration is often dominated by males. Thus the sample is not a representative one.

In this second survey, a four module questionnaire containing about 80 questions was used. The respondents were asked questions about reasons for migration, migrant characteristics, opinions and intentions. Modules used in the questionnaire have reflected similar aspects covered in the first survey we conducted in Iraq.

Both surveys were analysed using descriptive statistics functions of SPSS.

Figure 3: Age and Gender of Respondents, Survey in Turkey

Conceptualising Human Mobility in Conflict

Conflict and international migration are closely linked and there are many examples in the history. Compulsory exchange of populations between Turkey and former Ottoman territories including Greece, Bulgaria and Serbia is one such we have still vivid memories. Similar displacements took place in other parts of the world too. The exchange between Pakistan and India is another example to look at. Israeli attack on Lebanon a few years back just presented another case to be investigated within the same category of conflict and migration in the Middle East. Prior to that we have seen an upsurge of Bosnian and Kosovan immigrants (asylum seekers, refugees and others alike) in

Europe as people were escaping former Yugoslavia due to the violence following the collapse of the Federal Yugoslavia. The invasion of Iraq in 2003 and ongoing military operations since the first Gulf War have provided another unfortunate example to show us how conflicts are determining population movements in certain regions of the world.

Minority populations are particularly affected by such conflict situations but one concept is crucial in understanding such human mobility: concept of *relative deprivation*[26]. Gurr argues that violent conflicts are more likely to occur when the gap between people's expectations and actual situation widens.[27] 7 years after the invasion, we can clearly see that so little improvement is achieved in Iraq and internally displaced people and their return in Iraq has grown to be a major problem particularly in Kirkuk area. Thus one can expect intensification of the potential for civil conflict in the country. Such increase in conflict is I believe going to trigger more migrations internally as well as internationally. In the following sections I will elaborate the concept of the environment of human insecurity which I developed for understanding international migration in conflict situations. I will also briefly introduce the concept of *opportunity frameworks*.

There is a growing research interest in the nexus of conflict and migration. Wars and other latent, less intensive conflicts are closely linked to the international migration of disadvantaged ethnic groups[28]; however, more importantly, the research shows that intra-state conflicts, when compared to inter-state conflicts, cause greater casualties[29] and, by implication, cause larger population displacements. Therefore, intra-state conflicts deserve more attention from migration researchers. Nonetheless, as a force which facilitates international migration, "conflict" is not limited to extremely violent struggles but includes a range of situations in which parties with conflicting interests meet.

Contemporary international migration is better understood as a complicated human movement, involving different types of migrants, such as 'refugees', 'asylum seekers', 'family migrants', 'illegal migrants', 'migrant workers', and 'professionals'. In most cases it is impossible to distinguish 'economic', 'political' or 'cultural' reasons from each other, and that people often move with mixed, and overlapping, motivations has been highlighted in many cases studied.[30] The concept of environment of human insecurity (EOHI) also engages with such mixed causes for international migration.

The relative deprivation concept mentioned above led to another concept which I call the '*environment of human insecurity*' which was initially applied to international migration from Turkey as migration appears to be one of the strategic options in conflict situations[31]. Along with I also introduced the concept of '*opportunity frameworks*,' which I have later used in the analyses of Iraqi and Turkmen migration.[32] Hourani applied it to the Lebanese migration[33] while Erdemir and Zirh saw an application in the case of Alevi migrants in London[34]. Working with this model, I found that conflict aspects were more central and significant in determining migration mechanisms, typologies, and policies.

International migration can be discussed as a process involving two opposing parties—that of a migrating human person or group and that of a regulating or controlling agency–with conflicting interests. At the same time, existing migration typologies discuss migration in terms of voluntary versus forced, illegal versus legal, economic versus political, etc. However, understanding migration process with reference to conflict is also critical of those typologies which are not adequate to represent the multiple and dynamic causes and motivations for international migration, and they are especially not adequate to represent the relation of the migration process to conflict.

Various conflicts are identifiable at various levels in the migration process (e.g. within households, among individuals, and between governments). Following Dahrendorf[35], I use "conflict" with a wider meaning, referring not only to manifest clashes, such as revolts, wars, and armed conflict, but also to contests, competitions, disputes, and tensions, all of which may additionally be considered as explicit or latent on Parsons' scale.[36] Thus, my usage of the term "conflict" covers all relations that involve incompatible objective differences[37]. Hence conflict is understood on a continuum ranging from cooperation (where differences are cleared) to violent conflicts (where consensus is either not possible or not preferred) (Figure 1). Regarding international migration, for instance, bilateral labour migration agreements between countries are examples of cooperation (at the macro level) while refugee crises in war zones fall towards the other, conflict end of the continuum.

Figure 4: Conflict and Human Insecurity

The streams of conflict are described on many levels: the macro level (e.g. conflicting policy stances in sending, receiving and transit countries), the mezzo level (e.g. tensions among migrant and non-migrant households and communities, and also tensions regarding gender roles within households), the micro level (e.g. conflicts between individuals; non-migrants vs migrants), and also across levels (e.g. conflicts between regulating agencies and migrating human agency).

The streams of conflict[38] are the dynamic building blocks of the international migration process. The continuous conflict between the regulating agencies and migrants effects changes in migration regulations (e.g. the tightening of admission rules), and in response to such changes, migrating human agency changes his or her strategies, mechanisms, routes, and pathways. This corresponds to across-level conflict where the regulating agency is represented by government officials (e.g. border control officers) and the human agency is border-crossing

regular or irregular individuals or families. There is also across-level conflict when, for example, the governments of sending countries (e.g. the Baath regime in Iraq) clash with members of disadvantaged ethnic groups in those countries (e.g. the Turkmen in Iraq). When the former forces the latter to accept an "Arab" identity (i.e. the Arabisation policies), the latter may opt for international migration (strategic option: exit) or may opt to stay and accept the imposed identity (strategic option: status quo). Households provide examples of mezzo and micro level conflict with regards to the influence of international migration on gender roles. For example, when husbands move abroad as "guest workers," wives often have to take charge of the households left behind, which can even lead to violent conflicts (i.e. domestic violence) when immigrant husbands return and want to be the head of the household again. In the Iraqi case, conflict occurs on multiple levels; there are policy clashes between the Iraqi government and the governments of countries which have to accept millions of Iraqis who fled the country (state level); irregular Iraqi migrants crossing international borders without papers (multi-level); and the power structures within Iraqi households change as males are more likely to migrate and pass power to women left behind (household level).

In conflict situations, international migration may appear as a strategic option in response to insecurity. This is what we may call "conflict-induced insecurity" or as formulated in general, an "environment of human insecurity" (EOHI). Previously I have called it "environment of insecurity" (EOI); however, within today's heavily "securitised" international migration discourse (which has been particularly widespread since the 9/11 attacks), it is necessary to distance this human security perspective from state security perspectives and move towards human security where individual's needs are the most central and highly- prioritised. As I have discussed elsewhere, this approach may also refer to the model of Maslow's hierarchy of needs model[39],

which assigns significance to security among other needs[40]. According to Maslow, security needs come after basic needs such as air, food, shelter, and sex, all of which must be satisfied before higher level needs can be attended to. The security of home and family, community, neighbourhood and country (most likely in this order) will be prioritised by potential migrants. Of course, the perceived satisfaction of needs is relative, and this should also be taken into account. But, in any case, we can argue that emigration is one way of satisfying security needs.

The conflict-induced EOHI has two primary components. The first is the *material* environment of insecurity, which is characterized by poverty, deprivation and armed conflict. The second is the *non-material* environment of insecurity, which is characterized by the fear of persecution, discrimination and practical constraints such as language barriers[41]. People exposed to the EOHI have two strategic options: a) status quo and b) exit. The exit option may involve adopting a rival ethnic identity, defending it, joining the rebels, or simply leaving the conflict area. The status quo option primarily refers to those who remain in the region and adopt the dominant "ethnic" identity (e.g. Arabic), adopting the dominant "civic" identity (e.g. Iraqi citizenship), and/or aligning with government forces. There can also be mixed strategies.

Within this context of ethnic conflict, I identify a particular type of migrant group which was distinguished from other migrants by two key characteristics. Firstly, they were not directly involved in ethnic conflict, and secondly, they were already harbouring a migration plan which was not related to the ethnic conflict situation they were on the periphery of which. They had, however, utilised the context of EOHI to bring their migration plans to fruition. In considering this type of migrant it is useful to refer to Olson's conception of "free riders".[42] I found that the EOHI was triggered by the ethnic conflict and served as an opportunity fra-

mework for migration, which, in turn, assisted those individuals who had existing migration plans, along with the countless others, of course, who had fled Turkey due to the ethnic tensions and its repercussions.[43]

The importance of the concept of environment of human insecurity also comes from its emphasis on the [ethnic] conflict situations as "opportunity frameworks". When there are very limited legal or regular migration channels, the EOHI as an opportunity framework as such may improve the chances of migration for those individuals already harbouring migration plans and who are from conflict areas, but living in surrounding areas or other secure areas. Thus people can bypass the tight admission regimes in receiving countries. In Iraq, seven years after the invasion, one should still expect steady migration outflow due to EOHI and also with reference to that opportunity framework argument. For example, despite Iraq has been declared a "safe country" by British government, there is still a strong stream of immigration from Iraq to the UK.

In the Iraqi case, opportunity frameworks due to ethnic conflict can be identified for some ethnic groups. In post-war Iraq, as long as there is no functioning representative democracy, tensions between ethnic communities are likely to occur[44], and there is the likelihood that some ethnic groups will suffer from discrimination by ruling or dominant ethnic groups (currently Shia and Kurds). Within this type of political climate deprived ethnic populations may turn to emigration. In fact, even the possibility of such a conflict may prove sufficient reason to flee, and seek refuge in other countries. This is because Iraqis have already witnessed several episodes of 'ethnic cleansing'. For example, government forces had attacked Kurds in Halapja on 16 March 1988, and again in March 1991. This highlights a key characteristic of the opportunity framework; that actual conflict is not even necessary, as even the perception the possibility of impending conflict may trigger out-migration flows, in the form of refugee and asylum seeker flows, and other ways (including 'clandestine migration').

While trying to place migration within a complex web of relations where a multitude of causes can trigger and shape migration, I am deliberately avoiding the migration typologies because contemporary international migration. International migration is much more complicated than what the categories such as 'refugees, asylum seekers, family migrants, illegal migrants, migrant workers, etc. can possibly point out separately.[45] Compared to the migration typologies, the concept of EOHI better reflects the mixed causes for international migration.

This conceptual framework is informed of existing international migration models. Models emphasising wage, wealth or income differentials; migration systems; the effects of geographical and political proximities; dual labour markets, and cumulative causation are taken on board. For example, economic push factors in sending countries can be conceptualised in an economic conflict context. Similarly, dual labour markets in destination countries can be conceptualised as a conflict between immigrant labourers and natives. Migration experiences can contribute to a culture of migration and thus enable or facilitate future migrations in correlation with the degree of conflict at different levels. Therefore, in using the EOHI conceptual framework, I still acknowledge that Iraqi transnational migration is responsive to structural and temporal differences between Iraq and different countries of destination, and also that Iraqis have followed pathways similar to those of other countries in developing a culture of migration.

Now we can briefly elaborate on the environment of human insecurity in Iraq before looking at overall migration patterns. It will allow us to place flight of Iraqis into its context.

Environment of Human Insecurity in Iraq

More than two decades now, politics and international relations in Iraq have been determined by wars and internal conflicts. This is the main source of overall environment of human insecurity in the country. Perhaps we have to consider it within the broader historical context of the Middle East, starting with the 1948 War, which resulted in the displacement of 700,000 Palestinians[46]. However, overall environment of human insecurity refers not only such sudden displacements but a steady flight of people over a longer time period following any such decisive clash. Russell was arguing that international relations and international migration in the Middle East have not been the focus "in Western analyses of developments in the region", indeed, Iraq was virtually never mentioned.[47] As we will see in the next chapter, this is not and cannot be the case anymore as Iraqi immigrants constitute a significant, sizeable diaspora community in European countries, as since the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1991, the Iraqi international migration regime shifted from 'immigration' to 'emigration.'[48]

The chaotic post-war environment in Iraq and the existing tensions among different ethnic groups are the central components of an Iraqi environment of human insecurity. EOHI, however, is not an entirely a new phenomenon in Iraq. It has persisted for at least half a century, rooted in the Arabisation policies of Iraqi governments.[49] This period commenced with the war between Iraq and Iran (1980-1988), continued with the invasion of Kuwait in 1991, and the subsequent Gulf War. The United Nations' sanctions and embargo followed in August 1990. The war in 2003 was, therefore, merely the last phase of wars in (and on) Iraq, as Iraq had been bombarded almost daily since 1990.[50] These 'bombardments' refer to the Shiite uprising in 1991, Saddam's bombings of Northern Kurdish towns in 1991, and long lived clashes between two Kurdish parties (Kurdistan Patriotic Union and Kurdistan Democratic Party)

in the North. These specific conflict situations, combined with widespread poverty, the uneven distribution of wealth, and ongoing human rights abuses in the country, were the contributing components to the Iraqi environment of insecurity, particularly during the last two decades.[51]

In the wake of the attacks in 2003, some optimists were predicted a reconstruction which would be completed within the following decade.[52] Since then we have a clear record that this is not the case, at least after seven years. *Fighting the war* has proven to be far easier than *fighting the peace*.[53] The past record of the USA's unilateral, and I would argue, unjustified, operations, indicates that administrations built in such a unilateral way have not been successful, and that multilateral solutions take longer to be achieved.[54] Withdrawal of foreign troops and the establishment of functioning Iraqi governance are difficult to achieve in a short time span. This clearly illustrates that 'rapid reconstruction' is a myth. This process of reconstruction may still maintain long term instability, and therefore encourage Iraqis to emigrate.

As I explained above the EOHI can be studied in two parts: material and non-material environment of human insecurities. In response to such environment, one of the strategic options available to people is migration; to another secure area within the country or in another country.

To understand the material environment of human insecurity in Iraq we can begin with some basic indicators. Health service provision in the country is very poor. About half of Iraqi doctors are believed to have left the country according to World Health Organisation in the aftermath of the invasion. Insurgencies have seen thousands of physicians been murdered and kidnapped. By 2006, it was reported that about half of the civilian deaths could have been avoided in Iraq and easily treatable diseases such as diarrhoea and respiratory illness

had caused 70 per cent of all child deaths while only four of the promised 180 health clinics the US hoped to build by the end of 2005 were completed and none was opened at the end of 2006.[55] Medact (2008) reported on the state of health services in Iraq, where a high level of conflict-induced mortality is recorded along with 8 million Iraqis in need of emergency aid and child mortality rates were close to Sub Saharan Africa levels. Thus, one measure of human insecurity, health service provision is in a very poor state.

Gross economic indicators are often misleading but yet through them we can see the shift in Iraqis welfare. While Iraqi estimate of GDP per capita stays below $1,200, UNDP reported 65% inflation along with a long list of unsatisfied basic needs. The UNDP index shows that about 70 per cent of Iraqis' basic needs were not satisfied by mid-2006. This overall index also represents 80 per cent Iraqis were suffering lack of health services, 70 per cent were deprived of educational services, and 80 per cent lacked adequate housing.[56] Official unemployment rate is about 18 per cent but it goes beyond 35 per cent among young people. During the wars and attacks country's infrastructure had been shattered and therefore it is also a contributor to the overall socio-economic deprivation. UNDP had to classify whole Iraq as *a high deprivation zone.*

Iraq's revenues are largely dependent on oil income (95%) and that stream of revenues was already devastated by the huge costs of the war with Iran. Then there were international economic sanctions and the costs of continuous clashes and attacks in the 1990s and 2000s. This is what lies beneath in making Iraq a country in need of humanitarian aid.

Absence of economic opportunities goes hand in hand with poor educational facilities and low levels of schooling. According to statistics three years after the invasion, about one third of Iraqis had never enrolled in school while

another 26 percent did not complete primary school.[57] In another report in 2007, it was claimed that about 40 percent of professionals also fled the country after the invasion including more than a third of medical doctors.[58]

Regarding population, one should also note that 13 per cent of fathers are dead in Iraq. This is a terrible statistics but also can be considered as an added pressure because of high proportion of single parenting, which comes with associated costs and needs to be met.

Still, the routine violence and ongoing conflicts represent major part of material human insecurity in Iraq. The death toll in the following three years of the invasion was estimated to be about 601,027[59] and later in 2008, it was adjusted to 151,000[60]. The number of daily insurgent attacks was over 175 in 2007 while multiple fatality bombings were over 50 per month and killings over 14,000.[61] Daily monitored ethnic related attacks also stood at 15. These resulted in, today, one in four in Iraq had a family member or relative dead due to conflict. As I said above, major immigrant receiving countries have classified Iraq as a safe country to deter any Iraqi inflows but these statistics are showing the bare face of death threat average Iraqis face on a daily basis.

Non-material deprivation is both about the indirect effects of the war and internal conflicts and the perception of the overall situation by Iraqis. Some groups may also claim political deprivation. The two key issues are ethnic disparity in power sharing and absence of any governance in some areas. The invasion has created a new power balance in which Shiite Arabs and Kurds have a privileged position. Smaller ethnic groups such as Turkmen have to suffer from lack of representation. It creates a nationwide unrest or at least a bad taste which is part of the problem of insurgency in Iraq today. For many Iraqis, particularly of minority origin, human insecurity is linked to ethnic liberties and rights which are yet to be recognised

and protected. The level of displacement we have seen since the invasion is scary and surely would scare some ethnic minorities as we may yet see new ethnic cleansing attempts.[62] Lack of material security as a result of insurgencies and other issues mentioned above is likely to foster a strong perception of human insecurity which tend to stay even if the causes behind are removed. Thus this perception which is a part of the non-material insecurity is more important when analysing international migration potentials. A poll conducted in 2007, for example, shows that 60 percent of Iraqis rate their economic conditions poor while 75 percent rate their security conditions poor.[63] Nevertheless, I would expect differences in perceptions and reactions to the perception among different ethnic and religious groups because of the different levels of deprivation experienced by different groups. Then, different levels of migration by different segments of Iraqi population can be expected.

Iraqi International Migration

So far I have discussed the link between conflicts, deprivation, and resulting environment of human insecurity and migration. In this chapter, Iraqi international migration patterns over the last three decades will be presented based on data sourced from UNHCR, UN, and MPI (Migration Policy Institute). This would give the reader an understanding of the context within which Turkmen emigration takes places and interacts with. Conflicts, ethnic conflicts in particular, are essential part of the Iraqi international migration dynamics. Wars and postwar crises have all contributed to outflows from Iraq during the 1990s and 2000s. The tensions among different ethnic components of the Iraqi society, such as Kurds; Turkmen, Shiites, and Sunnis have contested issues between and these are also likely to aggravate further migration. Driven by economic, political, cultural or any other reasons, Iraqi migration is likely to follow the existing Iraqi immigrant networks like in any other national case. Thus neighbouring

Turkey and Europe will continue to be the destination for most of them.

Sudden population movements are not new in the Middle East. Since the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, which resulted in 700,000 displaced Palestinians, the region saw various other episodes.[64] Flight of Iraqis following the 2003 invasion and the flight of Lebanese following the summer 2006 War[65] have been the last links in the chain. In the aftermath of the Iraq invasion, there has been an increased interest in the Iraqi migration subject, possibly due to large scale displacements. Most sources today cite a total figure of about 4.5 million for the number of Iraqis displaced after the 2003 invasion, including Andrew Harper, the head of UNHCR's Iraq Support Unit, says UNHCR believes the figure should be about 4.5 million (2008, p.51). Harper also states that the capacity to host displaced people in the safer areas of Iraq and in the neighbouring countries of Syria and Jordan has already been stretched thin. Today, the most important questions revolve around whether or not these population influxes are about to cease and how we can understand future repercussions against past trends. Wars and continuing conflicts in the Middle East have turned many of the region's immigration countries into sending countries, and this has been true of Iraq just as it has been true of other states in the Gulf. In the past, Iraq was a country of immigration attracting many contract workers from abroad, but with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1991, 2 million immigrants fled the country and a significant number of Iraqis emigrated. This was perhaps the beginning of mass emigration from Iraq. However, Kurds, Turkmen and other minorities had already begun fleeing the country long before the invasion of Kuwait.

There are very few studies on Iraqi migration.[66] As a sending country, however, we cannot ignore Iraq, as there are examples of large out migrations. For example, half a million Iraqis, mostly Kurds fleeing Saddam's brutality have sought refuge in Turkey at the beginning of

the 1990s.[67] Few other studies have only briefly mentioned Iraqi migration, but often they focused on the Kurdish case in particular, rather than Iraqi migration in general.[68] In this chapter, I will look at the Iraqi immigration stock and migration flows to industrialised countries first. Then asylum seeker flows from Iraq will be analyzed.

The Anfal operations in 1989-90 caused about 200,000 deaths and the displacement of almost 1.5 million people, most of whom were Kurds.[69] When Saddam crushed a number of Kurdish uprisings in March 1991, another million refugees left for neighbouring countries, mainly Iran and Turkey. Iraqi Turkmen have reacted to Saddam's rule in the same fashion. Thus voting with their feet was a common response of Iraqi

minorities to the EOHI in the country. Today, about one fifth of the population is estimated to be internally or internationally displaced. Relative stability and security in the Kurdish-controlled areas of the north, some significant flows from other regions to the North have been seen after the invasion.

Industrialised countries have witnessed a sharp increase in the number of Iraqi immigrants following the 1991 Gulf War (Table 2), along with regional displacement within the Gulf region.[70] One possible explanation for this is the increase in the number of asylum applications due to the war and Arabisation policies in Iraq[71]. Annual numbers of Iraqi immigrants arriving in European countries increased from 8,140 in 1990 to 52,500 in 2001, illustrating a 550% rise. As seen in the table 2, despite its protracted

Table 1: Iraqi Immigrant Populations in Some Industrialised Countries, 1990-2001

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
Australia	191	1,407	1,539	1,092	2,539	2,617	1,966	1,793	1,510	1,673		
Canada	262	270	371	192	240	324	303	272	271	363	282	398
France*	108	174	237	179	202	236	279	217	331	245	262	296
Germany	707	1,384	1,484	1,246	2,066	6,941	10,934	14,189	7,435	8,662	11,601	17,167
Italy*	13	89	26	31	22	181	151	336	3,362	1,838	6,082	1,985
Netherl.s	--	--	--	--	--	2,990	4,673	6,130	7,372	3,346	4,445	3,119
Norway	90	131	111	137	126	99	113	272	1,296	4,073	766	1,056
Sweden	3,928	4,589	6,964	6,808	5,087	5,007	4,429	7,136	9,379	9,212	10,180	12,869
UK	985	1,495	1,240	1,105	1,120	1,470	1,580	2,690	2,945	4,010	10,190	8,345
USA	1,856	1,832	4,268	4,245	6,170	5,713	5,903	5,572	2,398	3,520	5,464	5,569
Total	8,140	11,371	16,240	15,035	17,572	25,578	30,331	38,607	36,299	36,942	49,272	50,804
* Only refugees.												

Source: MPI (2003).

war with Iran during the 1980s, in 1990 Iraq was not a major sending country, and the stock of Iraqi immigrants in industrialised countries was almost negligible. However, the two most recent wars in Iraq (1990-1991 and 2003-present) have urged more and more Iraqis than ever to move abroad. In about a decade, many

industrialised countries saw their Iraqi immigrant stocks increase sharply. According to OECD statistics, the number of Iraqi immigrants in OECD countries was estimated to be 348,527 in 2000, indicating an emigration rate of 1.5[72], which is shown in Figure 3.[73] Recent Iraqi migration inflow figures in selec-

Figure 5: Top 10 OECD Countries with the Largest Iraqi Immigrant Populations

Source: OECD, MPI, Author's Own Estimations.

ted industrialised countries can help us to anticipate future migration flows. Also once can roughly estimate the current stock of Iraqi immigrants. For example, in Sweden, the number of Iraqi immigrants increased from less than 30,000 in 1996 to above 72,000 in 2006. In other countries, we can expect similar increases due to further outflows in response to increasing violence and death toll after 2003, and particularly after 2006, a year which saw the number of inter-ethnic attacks, including mosque bombings and suicide attacks have increased dramatically.

Based on Iraqi immigration flow statistics available from OECD reports and Migration Policy Institute data, the total immigrant population in industrialised countries probably reached about half a million by now. However, even this can be an underestimation of the total number of Iraqi immigrants because there is no comprehensive data on naturalisation and undocumented immigrants. International Organisation for Migration estimates that 1,270,000 people have been displaced in Iraq in the two years of escalating sectarian violence since the February 2006 bombing of the Samarra Al-Askari Mosque, which is believed to have es-

calated sectarian violence in Iraq[74]. Due to difficulties in crossing borders and making arrangements for long-distance regular migrations, one should not expect similarly large numbers of Iraqi immigrants to arrive in industrialised countries anytime soon; however, an increase is likely in the long run, similar to the pattern that was seen in the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War.[75]

Iraqi Asylum Seekers

Iraqi international migration seems to be dominated by refugee and asylum seeker flows. In 2001, UNHCR reported that 530,000 of 12 million refugees in the world were from Iraq. The number of Iraqi refugees was 1,343,800 in 1992, steadily decreasing to about 700,000 in the mid-1990s, further decreasing in the mid-2000s.

Table 2 and figure 6 display the number of Iraqi asylum seekers in developed countries during the period from 1980 to 2009, and clearly shows that the rises in conflict [or increasing environment of insecurity] resulted in sharp increases in asylum seeker flows. Sweden, Germany, the

Table 2: Iraqi Asylum Seekers in Developed Countries, 1980-2009

Year	Number		Year	Number		Year	Number
1980	1,585		1990	8,556		2000	61,428
1981	2,533		1991	18,506		2001	59,348
1982	2,378		1992	17,662		2002	58,643
1983	1,290		1993	15,205		2003	31,688
1984	2,484		1994	12,937		2004	22,806
1985	2,263		1995	8,813		2005	21,043
1986	2,272		1996	35,767		2006	34,164
1987	3,727		1997	50,713		2007	52,017
1988	4,800		1998	55,066		2008	43,885
1989	5,760		1999	50,009		2009	22,982
Total	*29,092*			*273,234*			*408,004*
Per annum	*2,909*			*27,323*			*40,800*

Source: UNHCR (2008), UNHCR (2010), UN (2002).

UK, Turkey, Denmark and Netherlands are the most popular destinations for Iraqi asylum seekers.

By 2004, UNHCR records indicated that there were less than 312,000 Iraqis refugees worldwide however as figure 6 displays the number of Iraqi asylum seekers arriving in the industrialised countries increased again in the second half of the 2000s. Following the outbreak of insurgencies (e.g. the bombing of the mosque in Samara) added further pressure on organisations dealing with displaced populations. By the end of 2009, the UNCHR was concerned

about 4.7 million Iraqis outside Iraq, of which 1.9 million were refugees and 25,000 were asylum seekers; and inside Iraq, the total population of concern were over 3.1 million including over 2.6 million internally displaced.[76]

We should note that sharp increases in asylum seeker flows often come after some disturbance in the environment, or worsening of human insecurity at specific, conflict-ridden moments in Iraq's history. Most recent estimates show that about 2.5 million Iraqi refugees have fled to neighbouring countries, mainly Syria (up to 1.5 million),

Figure 6: Iraqi Asylum Seekers Arriving in Industrialised Countries, 1980-2009

Source: UNHCR (2010).

Jordan (over 700,000) and Iran, Egypt and Turkey (about 200,000). This means that the total number of Iraqi refugees and asylum seekers are over 2.5 million. Towards the end of the 2000s, we saw a little decline in the number of Iraqi asylum seekers in the 44 industrialised countries however; Iraq still remained the second principal source country of asylum seekers.[77]

Over 95% of the asylum applications reported in Figure 6 were filed in Europe. This is significant because those Iraqi immigrants in Europe and other industrialised countries are less likely to return to Iraq than immigrants in neighbouring countries. One can assume that the current total Iraqi immigrant population in industrialised countries is around a million, and that it has a correspondingly large "migration network." One should also notice another trend in Figure 6: namely, asylum applications tend to continue increasing many years after crucial events in conflict history. The relatively steep lines seen after major incidents such as Anfal (1988-89) and the American-led invasion of Iraq (2003) are indicative of this trend. One could see similar a correlation with overall migration flows as well. Crucial event years have always been the periods during which mass refugee flows were recorded.

Table 3 shows the shifts in the rank order of destination countries: Turkey (and Greece in early periods) attracted Iraqis because of *geographical* proximity, but also due to *cultural* proximity characterised by the migration of tens of thousands of Iraqi Turkmen to Turkey during the last two decades).[78] It can also be argued that Turkey was the easiest destination to access (i.e. long permeable borders), and the closest (i.e. geographical proximity) to reach, for those Iraqis fleeing their country in the period immediately following the Gulf War, and thus Turkey became the most popular destination between 1991 and 1995 for Iraqi migrants. In the later period, however, Iraqis preferred, and indeed managed to, migrate to other popular destinations. At the end of the 2000s, UNHCR

reported that Germany was the top destination for Iraqi asylum seekers followed by Turkey and Sweden, each received about a quarter of applications filed in the year 2009.[79] According to the same report in the last two years, Iraqis submitted 64,707 asylum applications in the 44 industrialised countries.

The three major clashes (i.e. war with Iran, the 1991 Gulf War, and the 2003 war), and continuous attacks have shattered Iraq's economic, socio-political and cultural life since 1979 and we can see changes in asylum applications corresponding to these periods (table 4 and figure 6). Increasing numbers of Iraqi asylum applications were filed in some industrialised countries in the 1990s, particularly after the Gulf War. It is important to see the sharp increases in the periods of wars, attacks or violent conflicts including insurgencies which increased in the second half of the 2000s.

Of course, asylum seeking, refugees and regular migrant counts and statistics are always short of the accurate figures about migration. Many Iraqis have opted for irregular migration because of increasingly tight admission regimes and the very limited opportunities for regular migration. This was surely the case for the Turkmen we have interviewed in 2004. As you will see in the following two chapters, the majority of Iraqi Turkmen emigrated from Iraq entered other countries without appropriate papers (e.g. visas, passports, etc.). Therefore the usual problems of compiling accurate migration statistics comes back to haunt us in the Iraqi case.

The Future of International Migration from Iraq

The overall instability in Iraq following the 2003 invasion and preceding wars, attacks and conflicts created an environment prone to a variety of group conflicts in an extremely deprived socio-economic environment. These are some aspects of the EOHI in Iraq, as discussed

Table 3: Top 20 Destination Countries for Iraqi Asylum Applications, 1980-2008

	1980-89			1990-99			2000-08
Sweden	7,844		Germany	55,048		Germany	59,416
Greece	4,650		Netherlands	34,002		Sweden	55,230
Turkey	4,083		Turkey	33,064		UK	41,925
Germany	3,939		Jordan	26,629		Jordan	32,714
UK	2,130		Sweden	23,421		Netherlands	21,055
Denmark	2,001		Greece	13,698		Greece	19,260
Italy	750		Denmark	12,396		Turkey	17,046
Netherlands	668		Austria	10,591		Austria	12,186
Spain	604		UK	9,710		Italy	11,735
Norway	564		Syria	7,916		Syria	11,442
France	555		Norway	6,349		Norway	10,866
Austria	531		Italy	5,868		Switzerland	9,025
Switzerland	402		Switzerland	5,530		Denmark	8,417
Canada	172		Lebanon	4,458		Lebanon	7,916
Belgium	89		USA	3,999		Yemen	5,914
USA	80		Canada	2,544		Belgium	5,635
Finland	17		Spain	2,093		Australia	4,990
Portugal	12		France	1,972		Hungary	4,642
Malta	1		Australia	1,429		USA	4,201
			Belgium	1,401		Egypt	3,523
Others	0			11,116			37,884
TOTAL	29,092			273,234			385,022

Source: UNHCR (2010)

earlier and they are likely to stay around for a long while. The contest between the Kurds and Turkmen and others, representation issues, political instability, and socioeconomic deprivation are there to aggravate further conflicts and feed into the perception of insecurity for many in Iraq. Thus there is every reason to expect a steady stream of out-migration to continue in the near future. These migration flows are likely to target the industrialised countries with sizeable Iraqi immigrant populations as well as neighbouring safe countries such as Turkey. Migration of Iraqis, like others, follows a variety of pathways using different mechanisms and opportunities. Like in the Iraqi Turkmen case, many would be asylum seekers, visa overstayers and undocumented migrants.

It seems certain that established networks of migration (e.g. earlier migrants, friends, and family), and economic pull factors (e.g. wage differentials, job opportunities) are potential fac-

tors in persuading Iraqis to follow in the footsteps of their fellow citizens who have migrated to the popular destinations, such as Western European countries. Given the current tendencies towards stricter control of immigration in Europe and similar efforts to limit and control flows of immigration by tightening admission regimes elsewhere, those potential Iraqi migrants will be left with very few choices. The literature reveals a variety of clandestine ways including visa-overstaying, illegal entry, fraudulent asylum seeking, and so on.

Not surprising but important to note that over 90 percent of asylum applications reported in table 4 were recorded in Europe. Also one should remember that the majority of asylum seeking population remains in the country of destination even if their applications are refused. Thus the Iraqi immigrant stock in industrialised countries is bigger than what is reported and likely to grow. Undocumented or irregular immigrants should also be considered when estimating the total stocks. Referring back to our concept of environment of human insecurity, those Iraqis arrived in 'relative security' of Europe are likely to stay longer and even settle down. This can be interpreted as an indicator of future migration flows.

The Kirkuk Question and Human Mobility

Kirkuk, the city and the region, has been a key concern for Iraqi governments and global big powers and of course for the people who live in there. For the former, it is mainly about oil reserves while for the latter it is a key human security concern. Invasion of Iraq and the ouster of Saddam Hussein in 2003 escalated the contest over Kirkuk and made it a crucial issue in need of an urgent resolution. As Romano (2006) put it correctly, both Kurds and Turkmen like to "portray Kirkuk as their "Jerusalem," implying a quasi-religious and inalienable attachment to the city". For Turkmen, the Kurdish claims remind Saddam Hussein's Arabisation policies. Turkey apparently, in line with her overall Iraq

policy, prefers Kirkuk not to be part of Kurdish controlled region but stay as an integrated part of the unified Iraq.

There are various claims about the origins of Turkmen existence in Kirkuk, and also in Iraq in general. However, this is again a contested territory and falls outside the scope of this study. Rich oil reserves, first discovered in 1927, around Kirkuk is the key reason behind the dispute and perhaps because of the same oil reserves the issue will remain unsolved for a long while. The Kirkuk question here is about the demography, about the population engineering witnessed in the area. The cultural and ethnic mix of Kirkuk is not disputed but the share of each ethnic group is heavily disputed. Over the centuries, Oguz Turks, Ottomans, Assyrians, Arabs, Kurds and Christians have contributed to this ethnic mix.

Within the ethnic-cleansing and counter-insurgency policies of Ba'ath Party since 1968, non-Arab minorities of Kirkuk have been subjected to heavy handed interventions from Baghdad. Turkmen have not been involved in secessionist movements but their Kurdish neighbours from the North, as they were more numerous, revolted against Baghdad several times. Almost after each occasion, Ba'ath regime responded with tricky and often brutal policies. Thus over decades, demographic mixture of Kirkuk has been played around favouring Arabs, who were largely brought from the South.

Mainly to prevent Kurdish domination and control, the Iraqi government have changed the administrative boundaries of the governorate and named the new governorate "Ta'amim," which means "nationalization" in Arabic. Following the crush of Barzani revolt in 1975, further Arabization program forced Turkmen and other minorities out of Kirkuk. Their land was given to the Arabs, who moved in with hefty government resettlement grants. Romano (2004) states that every month about 1000 non-

Arab minority members were expelled from Kirkuk area by Saddam after 1991 which forced out about 300,000 people in total from the area over the years. This should be considered in the context that in the years following the 2003 invasion, about 5 million Iraqis have been displaced. Also we know, many have returned after 2003. Nevertheless nobody knows exactly who has returned. During the first couple of years following the invasion, over 100,000, mostly Kurdish 'returned' and settled in Kirkuk (Romano, 2007). It is certainly not the same original ethnic composition which was once there.

Suddenly inflated Kurdish population in the city and governorate is a major cause of concern for other ethnic groups, and for Turkmen. Assyrians, Christians are all worried about the Kurdish intentions as the Kurds call for a referendum on the future of Kirkuk. Ferris and Stoltz rightly states that "the on-going struggle for Kirkuk cannot be understood except in the context of the country's human security and historic patterns of displacement" (2008:2). The Kurdish threat and deteriorating security in Kirkuk are threatening the Turkmen as well as others. Some Arabs had fled Kirkuk immediately before the invasion and continued to flee until today. They joined the large stock of IDPs in Iraq. Studies and reports refer to enormous number of disputes and tensions between the returning Kurds and Arabs who were resettled in Kirkuk by Ba'ath regime (Ferris and Stoltz, 2008, Romano, 2005, 2007 and IDMC, 2007). Kurds' massive efforts on gaining control over Kirkuk are difficult to hide. For example, main US newspapers The Washington Post reported that the PUK (Patriotic Union of Kurdistan) gives $5,000 to each family that permanently resettles in Kirkuk (Farinaru, 2005 and Wong, 2005). This terribly replaces the Arabization with perhaps one can call Kurdification of Kirkuk, which represents no solution but raises more problems.

Referendum in Kirkuk is postponed to an unknown future. The old records are unreliable and inaccurate. We only have claims from contesting parties over Kirkuk. However, the surveys

I report on in this book, therefore represents a good aid to understand the change of Turkmen demography of Kirkuk. According to various claims, the population of Kirkuk governorate rose from 850,000 before the 2003 invasion to over 1,150,000 in 2005. The city of Kirkuk is believed to host approximately 710,000 of this population by 2005. Some Turkmen parties claim to be the largest group in the city's population while Kurdish sources claim the majority. Some estimations, based on anecdotal evidence, place Turkmen around 20 per cent as the third major ethnic group in the city. However, while every ethnic group claiming to be the majority in the city and without an impartial and accurate ethnic census, we will never know the exact composition of Kirkuk. This is of importance as it is not only true for Kirkuk but for many other cities and towns in the North where Turkmen, Kurds and Arabs historically have been living together.

Iraq's current reconstruction path can be defined with Horowitz's "centralized ethnic system", which is more open to polarization and sectarian conflict as group symbols become non-negotiable. Romano (2007) applies this to Turkmen and Kurdish case over Kirkuk and foresees increasing violence which resembles to conflict between Jews and Muslims over Jerusalem. This is at least something to think twice.

The question to be asked at the end regarding Kirkuk and other cities should be: are we going to try correcting an injustice with a new injustice? Like everywhere else in the world, over decades these groups have exchanges amongst; married with each other and perhaps a significant mixed generation already exists. Forcing people who resettled in the area decades ago and their off springs, and their non-co-ethnic spouses to "return" to some place where they had never been before will be quite cruel and costly. There is no easy answer but a multiethnic city needs considerate and ethnically sensitive population policies which will not be undermining human

security. Only then, any further forced human mobility can be prevented. Although chances are slim, the hope is for a solution that will satisfy all parties involved in the dispute without resorting any further population engineering.

Turkmen Lebensraum and Emigration from Iraq

Suppressive policies and practices of Iraqi governments have forced Turkmen to flee Iraq whenever the opportunity arises or whenever it becomes unbearable. Reconstruction of Iraq, or the fall of Saddam Hussein's government saw some return migration within the country and also internationally although the latter has been very limited so far. Such return to peace along with the return of those who had left their homes may also correct the "wrong doings" of the Arabisation policies. Thus "the Iraqi regime's policy of nationality correction by which Turkomans have been encouraged to assume Arabic names and register as Arabs

in the national census. Many Arabised Turkomans are likely to reclaim their true ethnicity the moment the opportunity arises".[80]

In the current climate of disputes over ethnic minority populations in Iraq, understanding outgoing international migration and estimating the volume of such flows are extremely important. This study aimed at identifying Iraqi Turkmen's basic demographic and socio-economic features in relation to their international migration. The existing literature on international migration suggests that political conflicts, wars, and ethnic tensions are likely to trigger and facilitate out-migration. In some cases, this happens in a short time span while in others we see steady outflows spread over a long period following the peak of the conflict. Instability in a country simply facilitates these flows. When there are ethnic inequalities, underrepresented groups are more likely to emigrate than others. The hypothesis here is that this group in Iraqi case could be Iraqi Turkmen

Figure 7: Educational Attainment Amongst Iraqi Turkmen

along with other smaller minorities. In this chapter, I analyze the data collected in 2004 to elaborate international migration patterns of Iraqi Turkmen.

In the following sections, I will present the background characteristics, the environment, attitudes and opinions towards migration and migration intentions among Iraqi Turkmen as reported in 2004 a year after the US-led invasion.

Our respondents were highly educated as 29 percent of them either university graduates or at least enrolled with a degree program once. However gender difference is striking especially among those with no educational qualifications: as opposed to only less than 6 percent of men, a quarter of women were reported to have no education at all. Figure 7 shows that in all other levels of educational achievement women are lagging behind men. Only about 10 percent of the total Turkmen population did not have formal education. This is important as Iraqi Turkmen are a highly educated group in the country while Iraq maintains a very low overall ranking in Human Development Index.

In our sample, nobody has ever migrated in 64 percent of households. In total, 590 individuals from 371 households out of 1040 households were current and/or return migrants. This is roughly about 36 percent of the total number of households and corresponds to 10 percent of the whole survey population.

Living Environment of Iraqi Turkmen Population

A set of questions employed to examine the quality of life. These included questions about the type and ownership of the house, number of sleeping rooms, material used in the roof, sanitation facilities, water sources, and possession of household goods and appliances. Few other questions were also used to collect information on relative welfare and wealth of the household

in their own locality, including a question about the household's income level. To understand whether the household financially benefits from migration, remittance information was also sought.

Although the type of housing can be a misleading measure for welfare, it still reflects visible socio-economic differences. Property ownership surely indicates the wealth of household to a great extent. About 90 percent of all Turkmen live in houses whereas 9 percent live in flats. Nearly 60 percent of them own the house or flat they live in while every one in three lives in rented accommodation. 85 percent of the homes have water piped into houses for their sole use but about 6 percent have to share their water with neighbours.

Quality and availability of sanitation facilities are also widely used in demographic surveys across the world as important indicators of ones living environment. More than half of Iraqi Turkmen households (53%) have flush toilets in their homes and 45% use closed pit toilets. Only a small fraction of them (2 %) have open pit toilets. Sharing a toilet is not a common practice among Iraqi Turkmen.

To further understand the quality of living standards, alongside the respondents' own views of the quality of their living environments, our fieldworkers also rated the overall state of the dwellings they had visited and interviewed the residents. According to these, though subjective, assessments, our researchers reported that only 7 percent of houses where Iraqi Turkmen live would be classified as inadequate. 44 percent were reported to live in good quality homes while another 18 percent were in very good quality homes.

Overcrowding of houses is a problem reducing the quality of life as well as indicating a low level of living standards. We have used the number of sleeping rooms or bed rooms per person as such indicator. Having a private

Figure 8: Overall Quality of Turkmen Houses

room per individual is not a luxury but necessity. Among Iraqi Turkmen, individuals in less than 40 percent of households are likely to have their own rooms while more than half of them have to share rooms with others. However average number of sleeping rooms per person for the whole Turkmen population under investigation is 1.2. When this is considered with the fact that average number of members in Iraqi Turkmen households is about 5, it proves that we have a reasonably well-off population group which obviously is not likely to suffer from overcrowding. Nevertheless, one should feel the possible gap between the rich and the poor as the majority has less than a room per person while the average indicates more than one room per person.

Being mostly urban dwellers, only a quarter of Turkmen own arable land and one third of this was confiscated by Saddam's regime. In assessing the welfare of Turkmen households, we have recorded lists of household goods owned by Turkmen families. Following the conventions in demographic health surveys, we have asked whether the household was in possession

of radio, television, gas or electric oven, phone, fridge, washing machine, dishwasher, computer, bicycle, motorcycle, car, and tractor. These are also commonly considered as basics and indicators of a household's welfare level. However for cross check, average income of the household, own description of financial situation of the household and household's status compared with neighbours were also recorded. It is clear that almost every household have a TV set, a radio, an oven and a fridge. However, one fourth does not have a washing machine whilst one third does not have a phone. Dishwasher is, on the other hand, a luxury item possessed by only five 5 percent of Turkmen households. Half of households have a car and one third have a bicycle while only ten percent have a tractor and five percent have a motorcycle. Similarly computer is also enjoyed by only 15 percent of Turkmen households. It should be noted here that there are noticeable differences between households with members migrated abroad and those without (See Table 4).
Financial status of households is measured by average monthly income of the household

along with comparative financial status and perceived financial situation of the household. As figure 9 displays, the majority of Iraqi Turkmen homes are living on an average monthly income of between 100 to 300 US Dollars that is over national averages. However migrant households are enjoying better incomes compared to non-migrants. Iraq's GDP per capita

Table 4: Household Goods in Possession, %

	Households		
	Non-migrant	Migrant	Total
Radio	94	98	96
TV	99	99	99
Oven	94	98	95
Phone	60	78	67
Fridge	93	98	95
Washer	72	74	73
Dishwasher	4	7	5
Computer	13	18	15
Motorcycle	4	7	5
Bcycle	25	35	28
Tractor	9	10	10
Car	46	57	50
Number of households	665	371	1036

Figure 9: Average Monthly Household Income, in $USD

has been steadily decreasing from 1999 to 2003 although we do not have figures for 2004. It was 2700 $USD in 1999 to drop 1600 $USD in 2003 at purchasing power parity.[81]

The same contrast is evident when perceived and compared financial statuses of households are compared amongst non-migrant and migrant Turkmen. Figure 10 indicates that more than two thirds of Turkmen living on sufficient finances and as good as others living in quite the same financial conditions.

Most Turkmen do not suffer from an apparent deprivation despite they do suffer from the lack of access to some opportunities. Many of them do not have computers at home and a third of them have no telephone which for instance, reduces their communication opportunities and access to information. However, the reader should always bear in mind the fact that this survey draws a picture from a country shattered by a recent war. However, at the same time,

families with members who migrated abroad are slightly better off than the others.

Turkmen Households' Cultural Characteristics

In this section, ethnic and religious identities of Iraqi Turkmen households are outlined as well as their opinions and attitudes about migrating abroad. Religious affiliation of the household members was asked along with a question about their language preferences and where they feel they belong to. Unlike the general breakdown of religious groups in Iraq, Sunni Muslims are majority among Turkmen as only about one third of them are Shiite/Alevi (Figure 11). There are no differences between Sunni and Shiite/Alevi groups in regard to their migration status. This can be indicative of a general feature of Iraqi population that religious identities exist amongst every ethnic group alike. Western, particularly American, experts have often misinterpreted this by seeing Iraq as a country divided between the Kurds, Sunnis

Figure 10: Financial Status of the Household

and Shiites by mixing religious categories with ethnic ones.

The language is often the key marker of ethnicity and belonging. 99 percent of Turkmen's first language is Turkmen, a dialect of Turkish, and only less than one percent reported that their first languages were Arabic and/or Kurdish. The second language among Turkmen is mostly Arabic: 90 percent of non-migrant households and 95 percent of migrant households. Migrants were more likely to be educated so it is reasonable most of them speak Arabic, the official language of Iraq taught through

Figure 11: Religious Distribution among Turkmen

formal compulsory education. The third language among Turkmen is Kurdish: 53 percent of non-migrants and 30 percent of migrants.

As summarised in Figure 12, Turkish media is very popular among Turkmen and it is no surprise as they share the same language: Turkish. Iraqi media sources are second most favourites among Turkmen followed by other countries' media and destination countries media. The only significant difference is the lower atten-tion to Iraqi media among migrant households. However it is because the most Turkmen follow different media together for example almost 30 percent follow Turkish and Iraqi media together. Noticeable feature here is Iraqi Turkmen's vast interest in Turkish media that may indicate their strong cultural ties with Turkey.

We have also asked the respondents that which country they feel they belong to. This question can be used to identify the level of resent-

Figure 12: Preferences of Turkmen in Following Media

ment. More than 85 per cent of Turkmen have said they feel they belong to Iraq while the remaining 15 per cent said that they belong to Turkey. Close ties with Turkey and common cultural and historic heritage may explain this choice.

To further iterate the identity issue among migrant households, another question was asked: How do you define yourself? About half of respondents either left this question blank while some apparently misunderstood it. Among those who answered the question, 55 percent said that they define themselves as "Turkmen" whilst another ten percent preferred "Iraqi Turkmen", "Iraqi Turkish" or "Turkish" and 8 percent of them, all from Kirkuk, called themselves "Kerkuklu"[82]. Only 24 percent defined themselves as "Iraqi" (Figure 13).

Opinions and Attitudes Toward Migration and Migration Experiences

Amongst 1040 Turkmen households, 36 per-

cent was identified as migrant households. Mostly based on the answers of proxy respondents, we managed to collect information about the experiences and characteristics of individuals who had ever migrated abroad. Before the individual experiences, proxy respondents' opinions, perceptions about migration and about migration experiences of others living around is going to be examined. This is to describe the overall context in which migration has occurred in the past and possibly to occur in the future.

International migration often occurs when individuals are not satisfied with their own living conditions therefore it is worth to start with this: are Turkmen in Iraq satisfied with their current living standards? Turkmen were asked to rate their level of satisfaction 1 to 10 where 10 means delighted as opposed to 1 reflecting total dissatisfaction. Despite the majority of Turkmen have been happy with their current living conditions (60%), it is indicated that Turkmen with members migrated abroad are

Figure 13: Different Identities Reported by Turkmen

more satisfied compared to others (Figure 14). Thus we can argue that not those who are not satisfied but those who have been satisfied are more likely to migrate.

Then we have asked them about various opinion statements regarding what migration abroad entails. This is relevant as it may provide some indication of migration intentions and future tendencies.

Turkmen in Iraq disagree with the idea of finding a job is easier abroad as almost half of them claim finding a job is easier in Iraq along another group (about 40%) thinking finding a job is same everywhere. There are significant differences between non-migrant and migrant segments which can be explained with the impact of the first hand information as migrants might have already experienced job search abroad and Iraq and were in a better position to decide whether it was easier in Iraq or abroad. Less than one third of non-migrant Turkmen are convinced that migration will improve their material conditions while over 40% of them believe it would improve their cultural and political freedoms. Again possibly on the basis of their migration experiences, migrant Turkmen are more likely to believe that living abroad will improve both material conditions, and political and cultural freedoms along with better job opportunities. However it must be noted here that the majority of Turkmen are not interested in migrating abroad as most of them do not believe that migration will bring material and non-material prosperity (Figure 15).

Being not quite convinced about the benefits of migration abroad, only a small fraction of Turkmen, 17% of both non-migrants and migrants were reported that they have intention to move to another country within one year (Figure 16).

Figure 14: Satisfaction with the Current Living Conditions

For those with intention to move abroad within one year, the reasons were not surprising when migration studies are considered in general. Economic motivation that may include employment or better income or wealth (34%) and conflict, terror (31%) that means also war in the case of Iraq, are most widely mentioned reasons for migration.

Table 5 shows when mixed motivations also considered economic reasons may rise up to 42% while conflict and terror to 40%. Education constitute a reason for only 12% of Turkmen whilst family reasons such as marriage or joining partners or parents or children is a reason for only 11% of them. On the other hand, 58% of non-migrant Turkmen and 42% of migrant Turkmen would suggest others not to move abroad indicating a lower tendency to migrate. This is even more significant when the environment of endless war in Iraq since the early 1980s is taken into account.

Migration abroad was an attractive move for some Turkmen but we also wondered whether it is acceptable for them to move via illegal ways. So we asked whether they would prefer illegal migration if there is no other option. Only one respondent said "yes" to this question whilst about 42% said "may be" compared to 58% who said "no". When it comes to the reality, however, the picture is different. Respondents were also asked whether they know anybody who migrated abroad illegally and only 39 percent reported that they do not know any such cases. Among the respondents from migrant households knowing somebody who moved abroad in a clandestine way was more likely compared to others (Figure 17).

One in every five Turkmen household received remittances from abroad in the form of goods or money: 45% of migrant households versus 8% of non-migrant households. Among those

Figure 15: Turkmen Opinions on What Migration Entails

Figure 16: Intentions of Turkmen to Migrate Abroad

Table 5: Migration Reasons for Those with Intention to Migrate within a Year

	Non-migrant	Migrant	Total
Economic	36%	32%	34%
family reason	11%	13%	11%
terror / conflict	32%	31%	31%
education	11%	14%	12%
economic and family	2%	1%	2%
economic and terror/conflict	6%	4%	5%
family and terror/conflict	3%	1%	3%
economic family and terror/conflict	-	3%	1%
economic family and education	-	1%	0.5%
Number of respondents	124	72	196

Figure 17: Knowing Somebody Who Migrated Illegally

218 Turkmen households (corresponds to more than 20% of all) receiving remittances, 94% of remittances were fully or partly used for daily expenses while half of the households used it towards purchase of durable goods such as fridges, TVs, washers etc. Buying estates was concern of only 11% of remittance receiving households. 7% and 19% of remittances were used towards paying into savings accounts and debts respectively. 29% was spent on family health expenses compared to only 4% on family celebrations such as weddings. Religious

solidarity in the form of donating to religious institutions or paying alms to the poor in the community received attention of about 8% and 6% of families who had remittances sent back to Iraq by Turkmen abroad.

Where Did They Go? How Od Were They When They Gone?

The focus of the analysis now is on the experiences of 454 migrants from 371 Turkmen households[83] visited in Iraq during the summer of 2004. Most preferred migration destinations for Turkmen in Iraq are Turkey (38%) followed by Germany (21%), Denmark (8%), Sweden (6%). Turkey's leading role is because Turkmen are ethnic relatives of the Turks and it may also be explained by geographical proximity to some extent. Over 50% chose European countries to achieve migration goals while only 7 percent fled to Middle Eastern countries (except Turkey) while 5% moved to immigration countries of Canada, USA and Australia.

Among Turkmen migrants interviewed, 25% are returnees currently live in Iraq while the rest is living in destination countries. Thus information about most of them

was gathered through proxy respondents.

Figure 18 shows distribution of Turkmen migrants by age groups. In line with the migration studies literature, most migrants are in their most productive ages and they went abroad when they were young. Only a quarter of Turkmen were 30 and over at the time of last migration abroad. These figures also need to be considered in relation to the period when this survey taken place. We are still away from understanding the scale of migration in response to the most recent war and emerging conflicts within Iraq.

Turkmen in Iraq Migrated Due to an Environment of Insecurity

Turkmen in Iraq moved abroad massively in the period around the first Gulf War and this migration trend seems continued as long as there are wars or attacks in Iraq. Obviously Turkey's alignment with the coalition forces during the Gulf War in 1991 can be a major effect that jeopardized the security of Turkmen in Iraq as they were recognised as affiliates of Turkey for centuries. In response to such risk Turkmen might have found the solution in fleeing Iraq.

Figure 18: Age Groups of Migrants

More than 80% of Turkmen migrations had taken place after 1990 and about 45% left Iraq after 1997 (Figure 19). The first massive out-migration can be related to the Gulf War and the latter is very likely to be in relation to the Operation Desert Fox and continuous attacks in Iraq in the following period.

From figure 19, we can also predict that small increase around the mid-1980s could be due to Saddam regime's attacks in northern Iraq such as in Halabja. Motivations for migration as expressed by Iraqi Turkmen respondents will be helpful in understanding the relationship between such an environment of insecurity in Iraq and Turkmen's international migration as it was seen in some other cases.[84]

As figure 20 clearly describes economic motivations constitute a reason for a significant portion of Iraqi Turkmen. However the most cited causes for migration are two-fold: first, for those Turkmen might have felt extremely insecure, as they needed to flee Iraq to another country; second they did not want to serve at Saddam Hussein's army, which is particularly a key reason for males. Nearly 60% of Turkmen migrants reported that their main motivation for migration was insecurity in a variety of forms including war, conflict, political op-

Figure 19: Year of Last Migration

pression, and fear of persecution. In two third of the cases, migration decision was made by migrants themselves while in about 25%, it was the decision of household head.

Only about one fourth of Iraqi Turkmen had international migration experience before their last migration and one third of them had an earlier internal migration experience within Iraq. These indicate an experience of migration existed for some of Turkmen which may have facilitated their last migration abroad.

Migrant Characteristics

As mentioned above most migrants were young and among those 52% were never married as opposed to 48% who have been married

Figure 20: Reasons for Migration

and have kids. Married Turkmen migrants with kids often have two or more children (71%). Before migration abroad, only 17% of Turkmen had children. This is closely related to the fact that they were too young when they moved abroad and so did not have children.

Mother language is Turkmen (99%) although less than one percent was reported that the language spoken at home when they were child was Arabic or Kurdish. Along with Turkmen, a dialect of Turkish, 95% of them can also speak Arabic, the official language of Iraq. English, Turkish, German, Kurdish, and Persian are also reported as third languages spoken by Turkmen migrants. Since it is very similar to their mother language, Turkish (as spoken in Turkey) is also common among Turkmen although only a fraction of them mentioned Turkish as an additional language (10%). They also speak English (35%), an international language. Kurdish and Persian are other local languages. So it is understandable why these were also widely spoken by Turkmen. German is spoken most likely because most Turkmen migrants went to Germany.

Migration did not bring an improvement in terms of education for 72% of them while about one in ten achieved a level upper in their education. However given that only a small fraction of Turkmen moved abroad for education, any educational gain is understandably happened accidentally if it ever happened.

For a large majority of Turkmen, migration was not a mean to land in a job. Only 29% of them moved from unemployment into jobs with migration while for 64% of them very little changed in terms of employment. Besides 6% of Turkmen became unemployed following migration. However, as displayed in figure 21, before migration, 17% of Turkmen were unemployed which reduced to only 4% after migration while proportion of those in employment rose to 59% almost doubling those working prior to their migration abroad. In this sharp change, we can count in those who went abroad for education and on return as graduates, they took up jobs. However, this can only explain part of the shift. Considering the warfare environment of Iraq, it is not a surprise so many Turkmen stepped into employment when they fled the country although they expressed that

the reason for migration was not primarily to find job or earn money but conflict, war, terror and fear of persecution. As a rule of thumb, the readers should yet inspect these figures with caution as there were no means to test the representativeness of the sample we have used in this survey.

Irregular Migration

Type of migration for Iraqi Turkmen was not so different than their contemporary migrant fellows all around the world: They had to find a way to flee Iraq, a war zone. Thus they have often crossed borders without necessary papers and permissions. 50% of Turkmen have entered their country of destination without a visa. This

could be potentially the highest proportion of illegal migration recorded in migration studies literature. As shown in Figure 22, another 17% of Turkmen entered their destinations on tourist visas and then they overstayed. This can also be added to the irregular migration tally. Then only a third of Turkmen migrants followed a legal pathway entering their destination countries on visas or permits allowing them to stay as residents or temporary residents (33%).

Of course, we are not in a position to blame Iraqi Turkmen for illegal migration. Like their fellow migrants in other parts of the world, when there were no regular ways to migrate available, they had to improvise and find a way to get out of Iraq.

Figure 21: Changes in Employment: Before and After Migration

Information about Destinations and Composition of Migrant Groups

Migrants are often targeting countries about which they have some information. Familiarity helps in the journey and in the aftermath.

Only in desperate situations, such as sudden attacks or in reaction to natural hazards, people flee to wherever they can reach and get access to. 39% of Iraqi Turkmen had no information about the country where they migrated prior to their move. Job opportunities

in the country of destination (27%) were the most known issue for Iraqi Turkmen prior to migration that was followed by income level (17%) and attitudes toward foreigners in the country of immigration (16%). Education system and schools were also known to only a small fraction of them (12%) while health and welfare system was almost unknown to all of

them (Figure 23). These are pretty much in line with the reasons of migration we have summarised above. For example, only a small fraction went abroad for education; so only a small fraction made an effort to learn about the education system abroad prior to their migration.

In majority cases, the information source was

Figure 22: Type of Visa on Entry

friends (59%). Other family members were accounted for 16% of information sources. Finally it is reported that for all of those who had some information before migration, these bits of information had played a role in their migration decision.

Similar to most migration around the world, 59% of Turkmen went abroad alone while over

25% moved with some family members including spouses, children, and parents. 5% of them migrated together with other relatives while 10% were going with friends. Moving abroad with other family members or as families can be considered as a sign that indicates some Turkmen fled the country or had to flee due to conflict, war, terror and / or fear of persecution, or for cultural reasons, i.e. to avoid Arabization.

28% of Turkmen migrants were followed by other family members. Also about 20% of them were followed by their friends.[85]

However, 40% of Turkmen migrants had nobody in the destination country before they moved. 6% of them had partners and 8% had brothers and sisters already living in the country of destination before they set to move. 28% of Turkmen migrants had their relatives in the country to where they moved while 21% had friends.

Figure 23: Information About Destination Country Before Migration

Those family members, relatives and friends were not always helping hand in achieving migration and afterwards: only 53% of Turkmen reported that they received help from somebody in the country of destination. 10% who received helped was assisted by their close family such as partners, brothers and sisters, and parents while 8% received help from relatives and 14% from their friends.

The nature of the help for those who were lucky to have some assistance was various. A very small proportion received help and it was material help, mostly in the form of paying for their travel (13%), housing (17%), information about migration (5%) and help for obtaining visa and/or passport (3%). 15% of Turkmen were assisted in finding a job in the country of destination by their relatives and/or friends. They were either given job in those persons' own businesses or found a job in another place by their help.

We can conclude that networks played their part in Turkmen international migration in various ways. In some cases, further migration was encouraged among family and friends, while in many cases, Turkmen received help and support from their fellow Turkmen abroad in finding jobs, shelter and so on.

The Diaspora: Turkmen Immigrants in Turkey

Due to geographical proximity, cultural and historic ties, one would expect a busy international migration highway between Iraq and Turkey. This is almost exactly the case. Over the years, Iraq has been among the top ten origin countries for irregular migrants in Turkey. Saddam's brutal regime, wars, conflicts, insurgencies and overall deprivation in the country over the last few decades have been among the key drivers for the exodus from Iraq.

Over the years, some ethnic groups have been over represented in these migration flows. Before the toppling of Saddam Hussein, ethnic groups other than Sunni Arabs were fleeing the country: Often the Kurds in the North and Shiite in the South were leading groups. No matter how invisible, smaller groups like Turkmen have also suffered and thus fled their homes. These relatively small scale movements have been replaced by mass displacement (for all groups) with the 2003 invasion. Like the Kurds in the North, Turkmen have also destined for Turkey. This is pretty understandable as Turkey is the nearest safe haven. The cultural ties among the populations on either side of the border are another reason making Turkey their main destination.

Accommodating a multiethnic population and maintaining ethnically unbalanced governments over the decades, Iraq has seen various conflicts which have affected different ethnic groups in the country unevenly. Up to this chapter, I have examined the characteristics of migrants, reasons for migration and attitudes towards and opinions about migration among Turkmen in Iraq. Now, again based on a questionnaire survey conducted among Turkmen immigrants in Turkey, I will look into immigration experiences of Turkmen. This should enable us to contrast the two ends of international migration continuum and thus enhance our understanding. The focus is on the reasons for migration, migrant characteristics, choices, intentions, and perceptions about migration.

Results here are presented in two-way tables showing individual characteristics by religion. I choose religion to shed a light on the fact that Iraq is not a country of Shiite, Sunni, Kurds and others. A correct classification must mention Arabs, Kurds, Turkmen and others informed with the fact that religious divisions cut across these ethnic categories. For example among Turkmen, about one third are Shiites (or Alevis) while the rest is Sunni (Sirkeci, 2005) and there is no reason to assume a similar pattern is valid for other ethnic groups. Similarly, Arabs in Iraq as well as the Kurds also belong to two major denominations of Islam.

Human migration behaviour is explained by a set of various factors including wage differentials, regional unevenness, fear of persecution, education, health and job opportunities, wealth, and so on. However along with these external impulses migration is also a matter of individual decision making and goal seeking. Therefore Iraqi Turkmen in Turkey was first examined to see what they think about migration and their own living conditions which obviously moved them from Iraq to Turkey.

Figure 24 presents a summary of Iraqi Turkmen migration and their opinions and attitudes towards migration. Most Iraqi Turkmen said that they were satisfied with their living conditions in Turkey but a sizeable 20 percent were not so happy about it. Perhaps some of it was related to job opportunities as more Iraqi Turkmen said that finding a job is easier in Iraq than those saying it was easier in Turkey. Less than half of Turkmen considered international migration as a way of improving material conditions referring, income, wealth, employment. Thus no matter what they were thinking prior to immigration, the experience shows that their immigration to Turkey did not treat them well on improving material conditions or getting jobs.

Nevertheless, non-material improvement is clear from these statements. Over 30 percent also expressed some difficulty in practicing

their religion although this was not an issue for the remaining majority. About 70 percent of Shiite and Sunni Turkmen immigrants in Turkey believe that migration would increase cultural and political freedoms. Thus cultural and political freedoms seem to be among the most important motives for moving abroad.

But the bottom part of the figure 24 gives a clear message about the overall satisfaction of Iraqi Turkmen immigrants in Turkey. Almost two thirds said that they would not recommend others to migrate. Apparently some bitter stories are behind this verdict. Further studies, perhaps qualitative ones, need to focus on personal stories elaborating these experiences.

Unsatisfied with their migration experiences, about 15 percent of Iraqi Turkmen were willing to migrate to another country within a year while about another 20 percent were undecided.

Iraqi Turkmen immigrant households in Turkey are not enjoying much wealthy lifestyle according to their monthly household income levels. Over 60 per cent have less than 500 US dollars to spend every month (Figure 25). Considering the average living costs in Ankara and Istanbul where interviews were conducted, this seems hardly enough to pay monthly rent of a decent inner city flat. Although they do not complain about their living conditions as presented earlier, their migration experience does not sound a great economic success story according to these figures. However, one should also bear in mind collecting accurate personal financial information in surveys is always a challenge and often people tend to hide their incomes.

The following two figures (26 and 27) illustrate their educational attainment levels before and after the migration. 27% of Turkmen immigrants were currently studying prior to their first ever migration abroad. Among the rest, we have found about half with university degrees, which shows a very high educational attain-

ment level. More than 40% were at least enrolled for a degree program in a university prior to migration whilst another two fifth of them were at high school. Both are indicators of high human capital.[86]

Migration experience either was initially motivated by educational goals or it brought a new impetus for education or by migration Iraqi Turkmen found the opportunity to pursue their educational goals. Since compared to their pre-migration statuses, they are far better educated now as among them about 15% have a postgraduate degree while more than 40% have a university degree. Only a few of Turkmen immigrants never went to school (less than 5%). Again one should bear in mind the possibility of a sampling bias in the survey, but yet we see an overall highly qualified immigrant population.

Turkmen immigrants in Turkey have not achieved much economically as they report very low income levels. They seem to place much emphasis on education as shown in above figures. We have also asked them the reasons for their migration which are summarised in Figure 28. Two thirds of Iraqi Turkmen reported that they moved abroad for economic reasons as opposed to only less than 10% referring terror and conflict as a reason for migration (Figure 28). For another 19%, it was education and this may be an explanation for high proportion of postgraduate degree holders among immigrants highlighted above. This leaves us with migration mainly motivated by employment and educational trajectories. Only surprising feature here is the very small number of respondents reported terror/conflict as their reason for migration. As I always argue that there are no sole reasons for migration and mixed motivations are often the case. I don't expect Iraqi Turkmen to be much different. One other explanation could be that Turkmen immigrants might have largely come from Kurdish controlled areas in the North of Iraq where security is not a major concern compared to the rest of the country.

**Figure 24: Opinions of Iraqi Turkmen Immigrants, by Religion**

Figure 25: Monthly Household Income of Turkmen Immigrants, by Religion


**Figure 26: Educational Level Before the First Ever Migration Abroad, by Religion**

**Figure 27: Current Educational Status: Last School Graduated, by Religion**

Figure 28: Migration Motivations for Iraqi Turkmen, by Religion

Conclusion

Obviously, in any survey on international migration there are inevitable data collection problems. Firstly, regarding studies in the destination countries, there are hardly any population frames from which one can satisfactorily draw representative samples. Then, in the countries of origin, it is often not possible to find migrants themselves because by definition they are in the country of destination and we use proxy respondents in such cases. Another related problem is that there could be families or households moved abroad altogether. Therefore, we are not able even to record such cases in most surveys. Moreover, if surveys cover ethnic populations, particularly minorities in conflict areas, there are further difficulties. These include difficulty in collecting some "sensitive" information such as mother language or information reflecting political, cultural or religious preference. These were all the problems our research team faced in this study too. Therefore the results presented here should be read with caution bearing all these in mind.

Let's begin with the conclusions drawn on the findings of the second survey. While studying Iraqi Turkmen immigrants in Turkey, I was expecting a strong correlation between the conflict, wars and ethnic tensions and their international migration. Economic and educational aspirations seem to dominate the movement. However when we asked their opinions, many also reported that there are more cultural and political freedoms in Turkey. This can be linked to my concept of environment of human insecurity where such non-material securities are also important.

Educational prospects seem to be very important for Iraqi Turkmen as they had high educational levels prior to migration and also they improved their already high educational profiles after migration. Nevertheless, they reported economic reasons as a key driver. This is not very surprising as most migratory moves around the world would show similar results.

Turkmen immigrants in Turkey portrayed an unattractive picture of migration as they do not suggest others to migrate abroad. At the same time, only a small fraction of them were interested in migrating to another country in the near future. This can be interpreted as migration did not meet their expectations. Nonetheless, this can be also either a sampling error or a subsystem of Turkmen international migration. Since in the other survey we have conducted in Iraq, we have found that conflict, war, and fear of persecution were an integral part of migration and current migrants were reported to be more satisfied with their gains through migration.

In the survey conducted in major cities and towns in Iraq, we have found that Turkmen is a well-educated population. Reflecting a valuable human resource a quarter of women and one third of men attended university whereas only one in ten had no education. Representing a rich human capital, this should be very helpful in Iraq's reconstruction.

High level of international migration was found among Iraqi Turkmen. More than one in every three Turkmen households have at least one of their members migrated abroad (35%). It is even striking almost a tenth of the total Turkmen population via migration abroad. As only less than 20% returned, this may prove that Turkmen have been leaving their homeland due to the environment of human insecurity they have been exposed to for a long while.

Turkmen international migration can be counted as a case of forced migration. However, I would argue we can find features of forced migration in most if not all human mobility experiences. Iraqi Turkmen were pretty well off living in sufficient and satisfactory conditions. Thus without the force of the environment of human insecurity, they would not possibly flee their homeland.

Many Turkmen moved into neighbouring countries resembling to sudden refugee flows witnessed in the region and elsewhere. Perhaps due to such forced migration nature, they had to resort to illegal migration.

Supporting my argument about conflict and migration, an analysis of the years of emigration shows that most Turkmen (80%) moved abroad after 1990 and peaks in the migration flows roughly corresponds to the peaks in the conflict. Understanding Turkmen diaspora and knowing their size and locations are important in reconstruction of Iraq as these people are likely to be still interested in the future of their home country.

Turkmen are very interested in Turkey; they follow Turkish media, some even feel they belong to Turkey instead of Iraq. Turkmen's interest and expectations from Turkey should be given serious thought. As the main destination, Turkey is likely to attract many more Turkmen immigrants. However, neither total Turkmen population nor total numbers in diaspora are known.

Religious divisions in Iraq appear to be central in the reconstruction process. Religious composition of Turkmen population is very unlikely to be unique in Iraq. Similar to other ethnic groups in the country (i.e. Arabs, Kurds, etc.), Iraqi Turkmen population is also composed of religious groups including Sunni, Shiite and Alevi Muslims.This proves that approaches suggesting solutions based on religious representation are not fully compatible with the population structure of Iraq. Iraq is not composed of Sunni and Shiite and Kurds but the reality is much more complicated. There is a need for further studies on ethnic diversity in Iraq as well as significant efforts are required from the governing bodies to address the need for a fair census in the country to reduce tensions among various ethnic groups in Iraq.

Deprivation and inter-ethnic tensions in Iraq

have set the agenda for a while and this will remain as it is. Overall poverty, persistent violence, killings, and political dissatisfied groups in Iraq will continue to be the main corner stones of environment of human insecurity in the country. Changes in US policy towards Iraq and possible withdrawal of troops after the next year's presidential elections will have an effect, yet to be seen. However, currently, one in ten Iraqis has already fled the country and another one in ten has been displaced within the country. Hence, emigration will remain as one of the strategic options for many Iraqis; disadvantaged ethnic groups and those suffering from violence will be more likely to emigrate; and European countries (including Turkey and via Turkey) will be the most preferred destinations.

For the European neighbourhood, the implication is very clear. The established Iraqi immigrant population in Europe (estimated to be around half a million) are likely to facilitate migration of many more Iraqis. Historically, Germany, the UK, Sweden, the Netherlands and Denmark have been top destinations for Iraqi migrants and there is no reason to believe that this will change. More recently, Greece has become a favourable destination for Iraqi migrants likely because of its relative geographic proximity to Iraq. Turkey, a prospective European Union member state sharing borders with Iraq and Syria, is a prime destination because of geographic proximity. Moreover, due to cultural proximity, Turkey is likely to be a major destination for Iraqi Turkmen migrants. All of these countries have been among the top five destinations for Iraqi asylum seekers since the 1980s. One should also note that the US, Canada and Australia have been immigration destinations for a significant number of Iraqis, but the long distance and these countries' tight admission restrictions may deter many in the future.

The environment of human insecurity in Iraq is characterised by economic deprivation me-

asured by lack of employment opportunities, low income levels, poor health services and poor health record, and poor educational services. Social and demographic deprivation can be measured by high mortality rates, conflict-induced mortality, malnutrition, tensions and conflicts between ethnic groups. Cultural and political deprivation is largely marked by lack of representation for some ethnic and religious groups, actual and potential ethnicisation of political power and social services. These are embedded into a broader environment which is dominated by conflict and violence. Despite five years passed on since the invasion, there is little hope for these ethno-political conflicts to settle down. Given the potential effects of US elections and withdrawal of troops from the country, the future chaos is hard to predict. Civil war is already started according to some commentators but after withdrawal we are yet to see what will follow.

The environment of human insecurity in Iraq, insofar as it leads to future immigration flows, will primarily concern the above-mentioned countries. It seems certain that established networks of migration (e.g. earlier migrants, friends, and family), sectarian violence, political and economic deprivation in Iraq, as well as economic pull factors (e.g. wage differentials, job opportunities) will remain among the factors prompting Iraqis to flee the country. Today, an Iraqi migration culture, rooted in the decades-long conflict, has emerged. Iraq is now pretty much a significant source country in the global transnational migration regime.

Obsession with immigration control in Europe and of other industrialised countries suggests that many of those Iraqis who are suffering from human insecurity at home and seeking security abroad will be forced to bypass regular migration channels. In turn, such attempts are likely to produce tragic humanitarian situations along the borders of Europe, the likes of which have already been seen at the borders and shores of Turkey, Greece, Spain, Italy, and

Malta. We have to accept that desperate Iraqi people need help to survive, which requires switching from a state security approach to an approach focusing on "human security." Like Bosnians, Kosovars, and Kurds over the past two decades, we will see more Iraqis arriving at the shores and borders of Europe through various channels. Europe must avoid discourses demonising immigrants (particularly Muslim and/or Middle Eastern immigrants) as potential terrorists and, instead, recognise their needs as human beings. A shift to considerations of human insecurity as a basis for migration policy-making is imperative.

Europe needs to focus and improve on the (human) security policies in its neighbourhood. Ethnic or not, conflicts in the periphery mean more uncontrolled immigration to Western Europe. Capacity building in Iraq with Iraqis and stabilisation of the economy and political power in a democratic way to respect human rights in Iraq are the main objectives to achieve in order to maintain a healthy international migration regime (involving two-way flows between Iraq and Europe. However, this is a difficult mission as it involves many international, national, and individual actors and also requires the eradication of the root causes of international migration, which are, for Iraq, violence and economic and political deprivation. Main target here obviously should not be and cannot be to control immigration which is often a futile effort. Castles[87] points out three types of reasons for such failure: a) effect of social dynamics of the process of migration, b) the effect of globalisation and the North-South divide, and c) the different agendas of political systems. To those, I would add the multiplying effect of the conflicts at the country of origin.

The migration (including internal displacement) of Iraqis is one of the most striking outcomes of the 2003 invasion, and thus it has attracted the attention and efforts of several international organisations. So far a rich volume of data has been collected in the depositories of these organisations, which include the IOM

and WHO. In combination with an improved registration system in Iraq, these data can provide better opportunities to analyse and understand international migration from (and back to) Iraq. The personal accounts of Iraqis, when compared to others in similar situations, may enrich our conceptual framework in understanding the migration-conflict nexus from a human security perspective. Still, many more studies are needed to analyse Iraqi migration trends and to test and improve the conflict model of transnational migration which I believe is conducive to understanding contemporary migration processes.

Relatively privileged position of Kurds and Shiite Arabs in the country has already upset some other ethnic groups. Future moves of these dominant ethnic groups may cause further emigration of disadvantaged ethnic groups. Turkmen, Assyrians, Yezidis and other smaller minorities are likely to be among those. The European neighbourhood should therefore focus its policies on human security issues and eradication of conflicts and disasters in its periphery. A controlled and healthy migration system for Europe needs to be built around understanding and caring for the needs of others in the neighbourhood and contributing towards democratic ways of managing ethnic and religious diversity in countries like Iraq.

Turkey will be under special pressure because of its open borders with Iraq and relative populations of Turkmen in Iraq and Kurds on both sides of the southeast borders. It is likely to attract Iraqi Turkmen migrants as well as the Kurds and other minorities. For Turkey, a failed neighbouring state means influxes of migrants who can afford to avoid insecurities in Iraq. Hence, Turkey and European Union shall consider ways in which to improve the environment of human security in Iraq.

ENDNOTES

1   Sirkeci (2005a).
2   Sirkeci (2006) and Hourani (2007).
3   Russell (1992), p.27.
4   Sirkeci (2005a).
5   HRW (2003), p.5.
6   See for example, Russell (1992).
7   Sirkeci (2004).
8   Massey et al. (1993) provided a comprehensive of theories on international migration; for the case of Turkey see Sirkeci (2003).
9   HRW (2003), p. 6.
10 Batatu (1978), p.189.
11 Talabany (2001).
12 ICG (2003), p. 7 and Ghai et al. (2003), p. 5.
13 UN (2001), (2002) and CIA (2003).
14 UN (2001), (2002).
15 This is also linked to high fertility. In the period of 1995-2000 in Iraq, the infant mortality rate was 94.9% per thousand, and the total fertility rate was 5%, whereas the corresponding figures for Europe and North America were 9.7 – 1.4 and 7.1 – 2, respectively (UN, 2000, 2001).
16 See Aljazeera (2004), CIA (2003), ICG (2003), Ghai et al. (2003).
17 One should also bear in mind that there are different census results producing extremely different statistics for different ethnic groups. Thus the reliability is the key issue in Iraqi censuses. Please also see Sirkeci and Demirci (2005).
18 See: www.kerkuk.net
19 ICG interview with Jawdat Najar, TCA leader, Arbil, 27 August 2002.
20 ICG (2003), p. 7.
21 CIA World Factbook (2003)
22 Walter (1998), pp. 74.
23 See Kertzer and Arel (2002)
24 See Nobles (2002), Robbin (1999), (2000a), (2000b)
25 BBC (2009)
26 Gurr (1969).
27 Romano (2007) applies this to the case of Kirkuk as people's expectations of improvement in their situation with the removal of Saddam were quite high. Also see Oxford Research International, "National Survey of Iraq," November 2005, pp.3-4.
28 Sirkeci (2006) and Stansfield (2004).
29 Akashi (2006) and Yeo et al. (2006).
30 Faist (2000), Castles (2003) and (2004).
31 Sirkeci (2006).
32 Sirkeci (2005a) and (2005b).
33 Hourani (2007).
34 Zirh and Erdemir (2008).
35 Dahrendorf (1959).
36 Parsons (1954), p. 329.
37 Dahrendorf (1959), p. 135.
38 Sirkeci (2007).
39 Maslow's hierarchy of needs model (1943).
40 Sirkeci (2007).
41 Sirkeci (2006) and (2005).
42 Olson (1965), pp. 102-110.
43 Sirkeci (2006), pp. 244-255.
44 Wilson (2003), Aljazeera (2004), BBC (2004).
45 See also Faist (2000), Castles (2003) and (2004).
46 Russell (1989), p. 27.
47 Russell (1992), pp. 719-720.

ENDNOTES

48 Mass displacements of foreign workers took place after the invasion of Kuwait (Russell 1992: 721). In fact, an estimated 2 million plus migrants returned to their countries of origin after the 1991 Gulf War. In addition, a significant number of Iraqis also fled the country.

49 Batatu (1978), IGC (2003), Kerkuklu (2004).

50 Guardian (2004).

51 HRW (2003).

52 Day and Freeman (2003), p. 309.

53 This was already proven in the cases of Haiti, the Balkans, and Afghanistan, where the USA had executed similar operations (Barton and Crocker, 2003).

54 Pei (2003), p. 53.

55 See Lawrence (2006).

56 UNDP (2006).

57 UNDP (2006), p. 21.

58 UNAMI (2007), p. 2.

59 Burnham et al. (2006), p. 6.

60 IFHSSG (2008).

61 O'Hanlon and Campbell (2007).

62 See Sengupta (2005).

63 O'Hanlon and Campbell (2007), pp. 55-57.

64 Russell (1989), p.27.

65 Hourani and Senseig-Dabbous (2007).

66 Waxman (2001).

67 Hobsbawn (1994), 51, Hooglund (1991), p. 7.

68 See McDowall (1996), Nezan (1996), Griffin (1999), White (2000).

69 Allawi (2008).

70 Hooglund (1991), Russel (1992).

71 Taylor (2004).

72 Dumont (2006).

73 Note that the last 7 years are not covered in these statistics, and in addition, the Iraqi asylum seeker and refugee populations are not included.

74 IOM (2008).

75 Hooglund, 1991; Russell (1992).

76 UNHCR Iraq Country page, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e486426.html.

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84 See Sirkeci (2006).

85 These figures are not exclusive but in some cases overlapping which means some Turkmen had family members, friends and other relatives already living in the country of destination therefore the total figure may exceed 100%.

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