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History of a City: >>>>Mosul>> >>after occupation>>>>
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The forefront of the Kurdish militias,
the Peshmergas, backed by the >US
>troops, reached the outskirts of >>Mosul>
>city on April 19th 2003. On April 21st and after the surrender
of the first Iraqi army corps, the city was completely occupied by these
Kurdish militias. The Kurdish militias under the vision of the >>US> >authorities
gathered all the weapons and equipments of the Corps. By the influx of the
Kurdish militias into the Eastside of the city, robbing and looting of the
governmental offices started, of which many were set afire, which included also
the banks and faculties of the University of Mosul. The militias also took over
almost all of the governmental and Baath party vehicles and even the vehicles
of the faculties and municipality. The Kurdish parties backed by the Peshmerga
militias took up tens of the Baath party buildings and transferred them to
their own party centers. Fierce quarrels took place between the inhabitants and
the militias when some of the militias tried to enter into the west side of the
city which forced them to withdraw back to the Eastside. Later on the same day of
April 21st, the 101 Paratroopers division of US army under the leadership
of the General David Petraeus entered the city from south.>>
> >
The establishment of the first city
council>>
> >
The Iraqi National Congress under
the leadership of Ahmad Chalaby and the tribal leader Misha’an al-Juburi later
entered the city. Al-Juburi was severely opposed when he wanted to appoint
himself the governor of the province. It was also speculated that with some
relatives, al-Juburi robbed some governmental banks. On April 25th
2003, the >US >general invited
the notables of >Mosul >for a conference to
institute the council of the >>Nineveh>
>province. After a series of meetings and using Caucus method, 28 members were
appointed as the members of the council depending on the allocation method.
Ghanim al-Basso was chosen as the governor, Khasraw Goran, from KDP, as the
deputy, Yusuf Lello from the Chaldo-Assyrians and Ibrahim Arafat, from the
Turkmens of Mosul were appointed as the deputies of the governor. Several
positions were given to the Kurds from >>Mosul>
>who were members of the Kurdish parties. Attempts of the Kurdish parties to
prevent the appointment of a representative from the Shabak community failed
and a Shabak was chosen for the council. At the presence of Brigadier Khalil
from PUK and Dr. Shawkat Bamerni from KDP, the first council of the >>Nineveh> >province was
established at May 5th. >>
> >
The council started to work under
the direct rule of the occupation authorities and the influence of the Kurdish
parties backed by the Peshmerga militias. The Kurdish influence further
intensified when Hero Mustapha (Ms.), an Iraqi Kurd female holding >>US> >citizenship,
was appointed in September 2003, as the representative of Mr. Bremer in the
province. In coordination with the Kurdish deputy of the governor, Khasraw
Goran, and some of the Christian members of the council and in two steps the
Kurdish presence in the council of the city was further intensified; Firstly,
by increasing the number of the minority groups and the females. Several other
pro-Kurdish members were added to the council. Secondly, by a suggestion of
Khasraw Goran, aimed at expelling the Ba’ath party members out of the council.
The major goal of this operation was to get rid of the governor Ghanim al-Basso
and some of the Sunni Arabs. Al-Basso was dismissed and the number of the
council was increased to 41. In September Usame Kashmula was chosen the
governor, who was assassinated on the road between >Baghdad
>and >>Mosul> >and
replaced by his cousin Duraid Kashmula. The Sunni Arabs had their own candidate
called brigadier general >>Riyadh>
>and their opposition was ineffective. >>
> >
Withdrawal of Sunni Arabs>>
> >
Due to the recent modifications and the
appointment of al-Basso as a governor of the province, the Sunni Arabs,
particularly, those from the Islamic Party withdrew from the council. This
event created a large vacuum in the council and gave the opportunity to Kurdish
deputy Khasraw Goran to introduce other pro-Kurdish members into the council.
At the end of November 2003, the city was infested by the armed groups of
al-Qaida, which forced the government to send the aggressive Iraqi army brigade
al-Thi’ab (wolfs) to >>Mosul>
>to establish the security. In contrary, the assassinations, kidnappings and
bombings increased in the city.>>
> >
In March 2004, the Peshmerga militias
replaced Thi’ab brigade and the Kurdish parties started to enforce their headquarters
in the central and eastern part of the province: Sinjar, Shaykhan, Ba’ashiqa,
Hamdaniya, Zummar and Telkeif. These party headquarters have been backed by
Peshmerga militias and Kurdish secret security forces. Paying large sums of
moneys and offering jobs, the Kurdish parties started recruiting large numbers
of collaborators from other ethnic and religious communities; Yazidis, Shabaks,
Chaldo-Assyrians and Turkmens. At the same time, the Kurdish politicians
started to claim that the origin of these communities are Kurdish.>>
> >
In this unsecure condition characterized by
Kurdish hegemony on the administration, army and police forces, the
assassination teams were instituted. Many leadership elements and those who
oppose the Kurdish control of the administration and Kurdification processes
were killed. In the same period, the second and the third Iraqi military
divisions were instituted almost completely from the Kurdish Peshmergas as
soldiers and commanders.>>
> >
The
Provincial Elections
of 2005 >>
> >
Three election listings had competed
in >>Nineveh>
>province in the provincial elections of 31 January 2005: The Islamic party, the
supreme council and the Kurdish Coalition. Decision of the Sunni Arabs to
boycott the provincial elections and huge manipulations had given a golden
opportunity to the Kurdish parties to continue rule the >>Nineveh> >province until today. As a result the
Kurdish coalition dominated the councils of most of the cities.
The distribution of the sets in the >>Nineveh>
>province council was as follows: 31 of 41 sets for Kurdish Coalition, 4 sets
for the supreme council, 3 sets for the Islamic party and three independent
members. The governor Duraid Kashmula, who was candidate from the Kurdish
coalition, kept his position. With the establishment of the further Kurdish
control to almost all higher administrative units of the province and employing
the two Iraqi military divisions and Peshmerga militias supported by the US troops, all the potentials and
facilities of the province have been used to realize the Kurdish parties
agenda: >>
>ü >Appointments of tens of thousands of the Kurdish staff, for example, the
appointment of nine thousand teachers from the Duhok province to the >>Nineveh> >provinceز>>
>ü >Bringing of large numbers of Kurdish families, >>
>ü >Annexing some regions to the Kurdish >>province >of >Dohuk>>,
for example, Shaykhan district.>>
>ü >Forging the identity
cards and ration cards to show that they are original inhabitants.>>
>ü >Intimidation and terrorizing of the other communities particularly
Shabaks, Yazidis, Chaldo-Assyrians and Turkmens.>>
>ü >Handing the security
of inter city roads to another group of Peshmerga militias, for example, all
the roads in Turkmenian Telafer district, >Erbil> – Bartalla and Shaykhan – Duhok. >>
> >
The
Kurdish parties dominate the region >>
> >
It
is well known that the occupation authorities depended on the Kurdish parties
and militias in northern >>Iraq>>.
Ignoring the long standing animosity between the Barzani party and the region,
particularly, the >Mosul >city, accompanied the
militants of that party and the >US
>troops into the region and >>Mosul>
>city. Bringing of as much as Kurdish militants into the >>Mosul> >city in the years 2004 and 2005 was the
policy of the occupation. After worsening of the Security condition in the
province, the Kurdish militants were asked to leave the region. Despite that
different units of them left the region, about five thousand Militant
Peshmergas remained in the north of the province. >>
> >
It
was only in the years 2007 and 2008 the Iraqi government started to understand
the disloyal goals of the Kurdish parties and the fearful Kurdification
operations in northern >Iraq
>and >>Nineveh>
>province and started to realize the threat of this processes. The central
government started to change some of the commanders of the military units. The
commander of the Iraqi second military division Brigadier General Jamal was
changed by Brigadier Mutaa al-Khazraji. The Kurdish parties rapidly contained
the modifications. The refusal of the >>Nineveh>
>inhabitants to recruit in the army which is made of the Kurdish Peshmerga
militants and to participate in the political processes which was controlled by
the Kurdish parties supported by the occupation had reinforced the Kurdish
hegemony of the province. >>
> >
The
Provincial Elections of 2009>>
> >
After
all these disasters, people of the province arrange to participate really in
the election of January 31, 2009, aiming to reconstruct the reasonable
administration. There are fierce competition between the Arabs, Kurds and the
other communities to win as much as possible numbers of seats in the councils
of the cities, particularly, >>Mosul>
>city. Unfortunately, the United Nations office in >>Baghdad> >covets to reach to the real
population size of different Iraqi communities. The UNAMI also aims to publish
its report on the so-called the disputed regions to determine the regions of
the Iraqi ethnic and religious communities.
>>
> >
The
already dominating Kurdish parties employ all the facilities and illegal means
to win as much as seats in the city councils. They use large numbers of the
peoples, those who work for them in return of money or jobs, from the other
communities, for example Shabaks, Yazidis, Chaldo-Assyrians, and Turkmens and
even from the Arabs. They are spending huge sums of moneys to buy the votes of
the notables with their groups and Mukhtars (heads) of the neighbourhoods and
staff of the election centres.
They distributed ration foods to the poor families and neighbourhoods in
return of their votes. To guaranty the voting of those peoples for the Kurdish
parties, they are asked to swear before getting the food or briberies. The fear
of persecution, limits the activities against the wrongdoings of Kurdish
Parties supported by militias and even waging campaigns of the non Kurdish
political groups, for example, the unsuccessful attempts to assassinate the
Shabak member of the Iraqi parliament. The >>Mosul> >inhabitants have very welcomed a
Brigade of the Iraqi army which was brought from the south and replaced a
brigade of the Peshmerga militias. But the Kurdish influence in the city is
still not completely neutralized. Unfortunately, the Iraqi government still
could not replace the Peshmerga militants in the vast regions in the north and
west of the province: Hamdaniya, Baashiqa, Shaykhan, Sinjar, Zummar, Namrud,
Telkeif and Telafer. These regions are under the hegemony of Kurdish parties,
Kurdish militant Peshmerga and Kurdish security forces.>>
> >
Afraid
of losing the great numbers of seats which the Kurdish parties unfairly won in
the preceding elections, they started asking for the postponement of the
elections in >>Mosul>
>under the pretext of the existence of expelled Kurdish families from the
province.>>
> >
The upcoming provincial elections in Iraq and
the so-called the disputed regions will significantly influence the fate of the
region and the strength of the central government, therefore the transparency
and independency will importantly influence the political processes in the
northern region and in all the New Iraq.>>
> >
Recommendation>>
> >
In
light of the aforementioned facts that the Kurdish parties control the major
part of administration in the northernf Iraq and had subdued a large number of
peoples, the UNAMI should not depend on the results of the upcoming Iraqi
provincial elections to determine the population sizes of the Iraqi communities
or the UNAMI is going to commit a fatal historical mistake which will interfere
with the reconciliation processes in Iraq and delays for several decades. >>
___________________________>>
Written for SOITM by Abu Murtatha
and translated by SOITM>>
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SOITM
Stichting Onderzoekscentrum Iraaks Turkmeense Mensenrechten
Nijmegen - The Netherlands
soitm@turkmen.nl
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