| Iraqi Turkmen Human Rights Research Foundation | S O İ T M |
Date: February 18, 2009 No: Rep.3-B1809
An evaluation of the preliminary results of the Iraqi provincial
elections of 31 January 2009 yields several important conclusions. Firstly, the absence of violence and
a significant decrease in gross election fraud shows the Iraqi people’s support
for the democratic process in
Secondly, the size of turnout at 51%
might be considered encouraging for the election held in a country that has only
recently got rid of a fierce dictatorship and adopted democracy. Thirdly, the election certainly shows
a rejection of sectarianism by Iraqis, with some showing instead an Iraqi
patriotism. Important changes in the political
make-up of the newly elected councils in the most of the cities in the north of
Therefore, if the outcomes of the
present provincial elections are reflected in the results of the referendum on the
Iraqi constitution, then the accuracy of the results for the referendum in Diyala
and Nevertheless, it is expected that a
country facing huge challenges, like The hegemony of Kurdish authorities in
all civil and non-civil administrative centers in much of the Several factors made election fraud in
the north of Elements that disproportionally
affected the election processes in the north of 1.
Large non-governing communities (Minority) It is well known that hindering
minorities from voting remains one of the most common accusations of voter
fraud.1 The
most mixed of Iraq’s mosaic of peoples is found in the north of Iraq where the
Turkmen are found importantly in Kerkuk province. But Turkmen are also the majority
in many districts, sub-districts and tens of villages in the provinces of One of the major problems facing the
non-governing communities after decades of suppression from the Iraqi governments
is their lack of any central political and communal structures. As a result
they are easily exposed to external manipulation. 2.
The Kurdish administration Having only recently left behind the
tough guerrilla life, after decades in the harsh mountain regions, the Kurdish
administration remains characterized by an authoritarian mentality, and lack of
the meritocracy. Its principle aim is the institution of a The education system was politicized
and the Kurdish people have been educated from the early 1990s to believe that
the north of 3.
Kurdish claims Since 1961 when the armed Kurdish
revolt started, Kurdish parties supported by militias aggressively fought the
Iraqi state. They have claimed almost all the north of 4.
The post occupation situation Kurdish political parties with their
militias supported by the occupation authorities came to dominate almost all
the north of The region remains unmonitored by
the international community and there are no international human rights
organizations, such as Human Rights Watch or Amnesty International, in the
region. The UNAMI monitors the whole of Indeed, instead of increasing its
reports on the region, UNAMI decreased its reporting from a bimonthly report to
an annual report in 2008. Meanwhile the inexperienced Kurdish
forces administer the region with an iron fist, while the non-Kurdish population
suffers psychologically and economically: a.
Mass intimidations, thousands of arrests, assassinations,
kidnappings,
deprivation of work and disappearances are neither registered nor
investigated. b.
Tens of thousands of Kurds were appointed to the
governmental offices, while the number of Peshmerga militants increased two or
three-fold. The large Iraqi armies in 5.
Change of the demography The Kurdified administrations
brought hundreds of thousand of Kurds and established them in most parts of the
newly controlled regions. It was under such a severely
unbalanced psychological, administrative, economic and military situation that the
Iraqi provincial elections were held in the north of Turkmen regions Khanaqin - Diyala Khanaqin, to which the Kurds lay
claim, is a town where even by the middle of the twentieth century Kurds
constituted less than half of the population. But a process of Kurdification
was intensified following the 2003 occupation. Even so, Khanaqin is not
included in Kurdish region, but the Kurdish parties rule the region and they
dominate the administration while the Peshmerga dominate the region militarily. Almost all the staff in the election
centers were from the Kurdish community, mainly Kurdish teachers who get their
salaries from Kurdish regional government, and the centers were guarded by
Kurdish militias. The district still has a
considerable Turkmen and Arab population. Three members in the city council
were from Turkmen groups who could not resist uninterrupted intimidation by the
Kurdish political parties changed allegiances to side with Kurdish parties. Most of the national observers could
not notice any international observer in Diyala region. Because Khanaqin was
given to the Kurds, it should be asked if UNAMI observed the election processes
in this region. If yes, with how large staff and for how long in each election
center? It is also worth noting that there
were nineteen election centers, 159 election stations and around 60,000 voters
in the region. In addition to the manipulation practiced in election centers, buses
transferred approximately 20,000 Kurds, from the northern boundaries of the
district which border the Kurdish Sulaymaniya province and its Kalar district into
the election centers. Voters were also intimidated into
voting for Kurdish parties. At the end of the election period, after the observers
of the Turkmen and Shia parties were sent away from the election centers, the
staffs within the election centers filled ballots for the Kurdish parties. During voting, Turkmen observers
were put in places that made it difficult for them to watch the voting
processes properly. Some sources say that there were ballot boxes opened during
the election processes and that the observers representing non-Kurdish groups
were not allowed to participate in counting processes. Election center staff
was also frequently completing ballots papers for voters. It is telling that the turnout of
most of the election centers in Khanaqin reached over 90% and in some centers
100% and in many cases 90% were awarded to Kurdish parties, while the general
turnout of the Diyala region is 57% and that of all Iraq 51%. Other reliable sources also mentions
that ballot boxes from all the cities in Diyala region were handed to the
military authorities at the evening of election day except the boxes of
Khanaqin which were submitted the following day at 13:00pm. One of the major obstacles facing Turkmen
voters was that in many cases voters were allocated election centers many
kilometers away from their residence. Furthermore, the curfew for vehicles
which was declared a day before election in Diyala province continued until the
2:30pm on election day. This inhibited large numbers of Turkmen voters from reaching
their election centers: ü Villagers from Ash
Tuken had to travel 15 kilometers to reach the ballot box in Jabbara ü Villagers from Dahliki,
Seyid Jabbar, Sari Gul, Irjan, Tel Nakkar, Yasat and Devi-Dan had to travel 20
kilometers to reach the ballot box in As Tuken. ü Villagers from al-Haddam,
Um al-Gizlan, Bani Zayd, Hora Sinaydij, Shishan al-Kabir, Shishan al-Sagir had
to travel 22 kilometers to reach ballot boxes in Narin region in Kara Tepe. ü Villagers from Ali
Saray al-Sufla, Ali Saray al-Ulya and al-Hidhab had to travel either 5 kilometers
to Kara Tepe or 30 kilometers to Kashkul. Kara Tepe Two major factors assisted the
Kurdish lists in winning the majority in a well-known Turkmen Kara Tepe region: ü The long distance
between a voter’s residence and the election centers combined with a vehicle
curfew hampered hundreds of Turkmen in trying to cast their ballots. Such an
obstacle was much smaller for Kurdish voters who in many cases violated the
curfew. ü The region was
controlled by Kurdish militant parties after occupation and the Kurdified
administration appointed about two thousand Kurds from outside Kara Tepe to
government offices. This significantly increased the number of Kurdish voters. Furthermore, the Turkmen staff in government
offices in Kara Tepe was threatened with the loss of their positions if they
did not vote for a Kurdish list and many were made to swear to vote for the
Kurdish lists. It should also be clarified which subsection
of the Kara Tepe population suffered more from the following irregularities: ü Absences of the names
in the voter lists, ü The mistakes in the
names of voters ü Closure of some election
centers an hour earlier at 5:00pm. Telafer Telafer is a well-known Turkmen region and one of the
largest districts of The major election problems were made by the offices of the
Independent High Electoral Commission. The voter lists of 6 offices in Telafer
were not found which included 1,657 families. The number of voters within these
families totaled 6628. The same took place in other Turkmen regions, in Iyadhiya
sub-district where thousands of families could not find their names on the
lists. With large numbers of Kurdish staff work in the electoral office of The second most important factor which hampered Turkmen
voters from casting their ballots was that election centers in different
Turkmen regions were many kilometers away from the election centers where the
curfew for vehicles was active. According to some sources about half of the
voters, which accounted for around 100,000 people were registered in Telafer of
whom about half of the registered voters could not cast their ballots. The majority of the displaced families, which are numbered
in their thousands suffered severely from the aforementioned factors. Other
voters could not vote either because their names were not found in the voter
lists or the election centers were from their homes. Other groups of displaced Turkmen
families were not allowed to renew their voter lists. In different election centers in Telafer and in Iyadhiye red
pens were used instead of blue which rendered large number of votes illegible. Chaldo-Assyrian Regions As it is well known that the Kurdish political parties which
benefit from the unbalanced political, administrative and economical condition
between the Kurds and other Iraqi communities in the north of Iraq has
recruited several groups from different non-Kurdish communities in return for
promotion and wealth. The Chaldo-Assyrian regions suffered from the same two major
obstacles which inhibited thousands of the voters from casting their ballots. First,
the absence of voter lists and second, the large distance between the voter
houses and election centers in the presence of curfew for vehicles. Being the
Chaldo-Assyrian regions in In addition to the election frauds, the collaborator Chaldo-Assyrian groups appeared
to violate the election processes in favor of the pro-Kurdish Assyrian list.
This can be concluded from the events during campaigns, voting processes and in
the results of the elections in different regions. The Chaldo-Assyrian candidates and independent election observers
enumerates the major election frauds in Nineveh Plain as follows:4 ü The pro-Kurdish Chaldo-Assyrian
Sarkis Agajan, minister of finance in the Kurdish government, has about 2,600
militants in the ü The Christian
religious representative Luwis Kassap used the Churches in Kara Kuş to campaign
for the pro-Kurdish list. During Sunday religious ceremonies he asked the congregation
to vote for a pro-Kurdish Ishtar list saying that it was the list of the Churches.
Furthermore, Kassap waged wide slander campaigns against the candidates of the
Rafidian list. ü Getting large sums of
money from Kurdish parties, the pro-Kurdish religious groups organized large
numbers of activities during the period of election campaigning. ü To frighten the voters
and the Chaldo-Assyrian parties, which were not working with the Kurdish
parties, an attempt to kill the director of election campaigns of the Rafidain List
was foiled. Others were exposed to physical assault. ü Christian students were
threatened that the bus service allocated to bring them to schools and
universities would be stopped if they did not vote for a pro-Kurdish list. ü During the curfew
which was applied to the ü The families in the
three hundred flats of the churches, which were built by the Kurdish Regional
Governments funds, were threatened so that they would vote for pro-Kurdish Chaldo-Assyrian
list. Other reports stated that: ü The voters were
strongly pressed in the election centers to vote for pro-Kurdish Assyrian list. ü Names were omitted
from the voter lists in the election centers. ü In many cases, it was
founded that people were given cash money and asked to swear to vote for
specific lists. ü As in other areas, the
high turnout in the Chaldo-Assyrian regions under Kurdish militia control, is
most probably due to the filling of unused ballots by the staff of the election
centers in favor of Kurdish or pro-Kurdish lists. The abnormally high votes for
those lists sometimes reached to 90%, and appear to support this possibility. ü In some centers in
Duhok, where large numbers of displaced Chaldo-Assyrian voted, the center’s
staffs were almost all Kurdish and claimed that the ballot papers ran out. ü The pro-Kurdish Ishtar
slate has been accused by Chaldo-Assyrian in the
Yazidis Regions The election observers of the Yazidi
Movement for Reform and Progress, which is headed by Yazidi member of the Iraqi
Parliament Amin Farhan, registered large numbers of election fraud in the
Yazidi regions: Shaykhan, Sinjar, Tilkeif districts and al-Kus, Baashiqa,
al-Qayrawan and al-Qahtaniya sub-districts. Since the occupation, the Yazidi
community has been suppressed by the Kurdish militias. These militias spread rumours
that those not voting for the KDP will be punished either by arrest or with the
cessation of their ration cards. The head branch 17 of KAP, Sarbast and Kurdish
soldiers from the Iraqi Third Military corps participated in the intimidation.
A CD Video film proving these claims were given to the Independent Electoral
Commission of Iraq. The replacement of the Kurdish
Peshmergas by the Iraqi soldiers could not be completed in Yazidi regions. The
domination of the election centers in Yazidi regions by Kurdish staff and the
guarding of election centers by Kurdish Peshmergas almost removed the legal
environment for fair elections. The pressure and intimidation to vote for the
Kurdish list by Peshmerga militants were one of several major election frauds: ü In the al-Shamal sub-district
almost all the staff of the election centers was Kurdish teachers appointed by Kurdish
parties from the Duhok governorate. All are also well known members of Kurdish
parties. These centers were guarded by militias from Kurdish parties. ü All the observers from
the Yazidi parties who are opponents to the Kurdish parties were not allowed to
enter the election centers in the districts of Shaykhan, Tilkef, al-Kush and sub-districts
of al-Faruk and al-Tamim. For example, in Lalish election center, the observer
from the Yazidi Movement for Reform and Progress Yousif Khadida Malko was not
allowed to enter the center by Ali Huseyin, a member of the KDP, and the staff
in the election center. ü All the ballots which
were not used were completed by Kurdish staff after the close of voting and,
therefore, the turnout in some centers was abnormally high. ü Campaigns for Kurdish
parties and Kurdish candidates were continued in front of the election centers. ü The vehicle curfew was
selectively applied by Kurdish Peshmerga, specially against the groups who were
opponents of the Kurdish parties. ü The election centers
closed at 7:00pm in several regions. ü At 5:00pm Kurdish
militias entered houses and forced people to go to election centers and vote
for the Kurdish list. ü The ballots of
thousands of illiterates were filled by the directors of election centers in
support of the Kurdish list. ü At 3:30pm on election day,
the first candidate from the Kurdish list, Kasim Salih Huseyin entered the
election center in the Third Qurtuba al-Mukhtalata (No. 321018) and visited all
the election stations before meeting secretly with the director of the center,
Kasim Osman, for twenty minutes. He remained in the center for one hour. The following election fraud was
registered in the election center in the a.
At 10:10am, the director of the al-Shamal sub-district
visited the center with his guards and after voting talked with the director of
the center about the KDP voters. b.
The number of staff was 38 of whom 34 were from Kurdish
parties. There was additional election fraud
by Kurdish militias in the schools of Al-Andalus compound in the al-Shamal sub-district: a.
At 10:00am, the director of al-Shamal sub-district, Khidr
Rashsho, visited two centers with his guards and talked to the Kurdish staff in
favor of voters for Kurdish parties. b.
At 2:00pm, the commander of the Kurdish militia group with
his armed guards entered the election center to show Kurdish hegemony and
frighten the voters. c.
At 2:00pm the deputy of the head of the Branch 17 of KDP of
Sinjar (Khalid) entered another election center with KDP party authority, Ilyas
Haji Barakat, and visited all the voting stations and asked for information
about the voters of Yazidi Movement for Reform and Progress which is an opponent
to the Kurdish parties. The head of the city council in
district al-Baaj, Jasim Muhammed Huseyin, is from Rambusi region and a member
of the KDP who was appointed as a member of staff in the Rambusi election
center. He was accompanied by an armed guard on his visit and he toured
continuously in the stations of the two election centers. He interfered
directly with voting processes and kicked an observer called Fadhil Khayri
Biso. The director of the al-Kahtaniya election
center, Sido Khashsho Nafkhosh, who is also a member of the KDP staffer within
the IHEC, and head of the city council in the sub-districts of al-Kahtaniya
toured the election centers in the sub-district al-Kahtaniya, al-Jazeera,
al-Adnaniya and al-Rambusi and asked the staff to encourage voting for the KDP.
Shabak reports Electoral irregularities started during the election
campaigns when the posters of the non-Kurdish lists were removed. The
candidates from the non-Kurdish lists were not allowed by Kurdish authorities
to enter the region to campaign for their lists. Under the pressure of the
Kurdish parties, the Independent High Electoral Commission obeyed several
Kurdish pressures, for example, 24,000 voters in “We frequently announced that the presence of the Kurdish
Peshmerga in the In many instances, the observers of the political parties
were not allowed to participate in counting processes, the ballot boxes of the
Darawish region, for example, were taken to Baashiqa but the observers were not
informed about the whereabouts of the boxes before they went to Mosul. The Kurdish authorities worked to annul the ballot boxes in
which the majority of ballots were not for Kurdish list, for example, the boxes
of Khazna Tepe center, where the Shabak list win 2,400 of 3,000 votes. Some fifty ballot boxes were brought by the deputy director
of the al-Shamal center, Nawwaf Ilyas, on the days after the election claiming
that these boxes were forgotten. Despite the fact that the original Shabak candidate won 13,000
votes, and while the pro-Kurdish Shabak candidate won only 2,500, Kurdish
authorities worked intensively to reverse the outcome and show that their
candidate had won the majority. The Shabaks were continuously threatened by Kurdish
militants who stated that they would not allow them to enter the Shaykhan and
Baashiqa regions if the pro-Kurdish Shabak list did not win. Due to the previous actions of the Kurdish militias and
continuous intimidation on opponents, the observers of the non-Kurdish lists
are now living in a difficult psychological condition. Conclusions Elections in the north of If the aggressive desire of the Kurdish
parties to gain vast Iraqi land is taken into consideration then the organization
of an impartial election in the north of Events during the electoral campaigns
and the incongruity of the election results expose partiality in the large
areas in the north of Pre-elections The huge wealth of Kurdish parties is pitted against the
modest finances of the other communities, particularly the minorities. This
unbalanced economical condition deviates the equation of power toward the
Kurdish and pro-Kurdish lists. Some politicians were either afraid or prevented
form entering their regions to wage campaigns. There were also cases were
campaign tools such as posters and pamphlets of the non-Kurdish lists were
removed. Accusations were also made of vote-buying with cash payments being
made after voters swore to support Kurdish or pro-Kurdish lists, and voters
also faced threats that they would be dismissed from their jobs. The long
distances between voters voting centers combined with the absence of voter
names from many voter lists deprived large number of non-governing community
groups. During elections During the elections, there were instances of Kurdish
activists frightening, threatening and pressing voters to cast their votes for
the Kurdish list. There were also instances where votes were transferred to the
Kurdish list by election center staff who completed unused ballots in their
favor. The curfew for vehicles was often violated inside and between the
provinces. Specific voters were transferred inside cities and between the
districts. Thousands of Kurds travelled: ü from Sulaymaniya voted
in Khanaqin ü through ü from Post-elections The difficult situation of the election observers from
non-Kurdish political list in the areas controlled by Kurdish Peshmergas was
made more difficult by actions, such as the dismissal of Assyrian staff who were
found not to have voted for the pro-Kurdish Ishtar list.5 Incongruity of the results The turnout in the regions where the
election centers were staffed mainly by Kurds and guarded by Kurdish Peshmergas
proved abnormally high, and in some centers reached about 100%. In these
regions the Kurdish list also won an abnormally high percentage of the votes,
in some cases over 90%. When the election results of a minority group, such as
the Chaldo-Assyrian, in the regions controlled by the Kurdish parties are compared
with other regions, the pro-Kurdish list received many fewer votes. Because significant electoral fraud can
take place in a short time, the observation of an election center for few hours
can be considered ineffective– especially if there are four hundred international
observers assigned to the thousands of election centers, each of which has
dozens of ballot boxes. Logically therefore, the positions of the international
observers should be carefully determined. They should be developed in the regions
that are most vulnerable to electoral fraud. During the provincial elections
however, the most vulnerable regions lacked international observers. The large areas
that UNAMI intends to divide between the ethnic Kurdish region and the Iraqi
state were empty of international observers. In the most disputed and large Recommendations Ø
UNAMI should consider the following
before parceling the lands in the north of ü
The disturbed psychological and
economical condition of the non-Kurdish population in the north of ü
Physiological and economical rehabilitation of the non-Kurdish
communities to decrease their vulnerability. ü
The great demographic changes,
particularly Kurdification of administration, introduced by Kurdish parties
which ruled the region with an iron fist since the occupation in 2003. ü
The increase of the Kurdish populations in many important
regions during 20th century. ü
That there were almost no international observers in the
so-called disputed areas ü
How UNAMI could monitor the elections in the sensitive areas
with so few staff, especially when it is well known that the movement of the
UNAMI staff is strictly limited. Ø
The optimum choice to solve the
boundary problems between the ethnic Kurdish federal region and the multiethnic
Iraqi state is to generalize the Kerkuk law of 23: ü
The civil governmental administrations, the
military, the police and the security forces should be fairly distributed
between the communities in the region. ü
The demographical changes should be
corrected. _________________________________________________ References: 1.
http://www.alternet.org/blogs/democracy/94450/the_right_way_to_report_voter_fraud/ 2.
A map of so-called 3.
The joint UNPO-Assyrian Council in Europe
(ACE) election Observation Team “Preliminary Report: Iraqi Provincial Elections
in 4.
The report of al-Rafidain list which is
signed by Sami Habib Astipho, the candidate of the list, Imad Behnam Robil, the
co-coordinator of the list, Ninos Gorgis Odisho, the authorized staff of the list,
presented to the IHEC at 2.2.2009. 5. An Article titled “The Christians affairs attention office in Telskof dismiss several of staffs who did not vote for Ishtar list” published in the website Muntadayat Ainkawa. http://www.ankawa.com/forum/index.php/topic,266900.0.html
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