‘Oil for Soil’ ICG
Report: A misinterpretation, a misperception or imposition of the fait
accompli?
No: Rep.32-K2508
There is no doubt
but that there are significant differences in the values of different
communities and cultures. There are also
differences in how people perceive and interpret these values, which are
considered from the major motivators of the behaviors of the individuals and
masses. People react in different ways when they come across a threat or a
challenge to their values. Unfamiliarity
with the eastern culture and mentality has surely played an important role in
the thousands of mistakes made by occupation authorities in Iraq – an issue
that has been addressed by the US secretary for foreign affairs Ms. Condoleezza
Rice.1, 2 The same factor was a key point of attacks
for critics of Mr. de Mistura during his endeavors to solve the Kerkuk problem
- whereas, the former head of the UNAMI, Mr. Ashraf Jehanqir Qazi – coming from an
Eastern background and so, culture, has not experienced such problems.
The recent
International Crisis Group (ICG) report entitled “Oil for Soil: Toward a Grand
Bargain on Iraq
and the Kurds” exposes a similar lack of understanding. This is visible when we
consider the following issues:
•
The report is
written without a genuine consideration of Eastern ethics whilst dealing with
fundamental rights. Ideas such as land and dignity are however, considered with
an awareness of the ‘honor’ traditions of the Eastern community which is a
concession that should not be made.
•
It concerns
itself solely resolving the conflicts of power holders.
•
It ignores the
concept of justice. Iraqis having been severely deprived of it for decades are
today in great need of it and highly aware of it.
•
The report marginalizes
the predominant Iraqi non-ruling populations (minorities) in the ‘disputed
areas’. It exposes their lands to bargain and encourage the ongoing oppression
of these populations.
•
It depends on
several severely disputed articles of the Iraqi constitution in the basing of
its recommendations
•
It is spiritless
as if the problems deal only with materials.
The report bases its hypotheses on
an unreliable Kurdish claim, supporting it with an incorrect understanding of
historical events.
“The main culprit is a dispute over territories claimed by
the Kurds as historically belonging to Kurdistan – territories that contain as
much as 13 per cent of Iraq’s
proven oil reserves”
“This conflict reflects a deep schism between Arabs and
Kurds that began with the creation of modern Iraq after World War I”
The ICG’s
report exposes vast amounts of Iraqi land and wealth to a bargain with the
Kurds in line with Kurdish claims - an issue that should clearly be one to be
dealt with by historians. Furthermore,
the issue of the ‘disputed areas’ on which the report is based, is considered
one of the several major severely disputed items of the article on federalism.
The report
mistakenly refers back to the schism between the Arabs and Kurds after the
First World War. In fact, Kurdish attacks on the central governments date back
to ancient history and have not been only with Arabs:3,4
“All of the non-Persian, tribal,
pastoral, Iranian group in the foothills and mountains of the Zagros range
along the eastern fringes of Iraq
were called Kurds at that time. Their presence usually made known through
conflict, as thieves and bandits, with their neighbours
or by making common cause with other rural forces against some central
authorities” Michael Morony
“The Koords, who in all ages must
have been troublesome neighbours” Claudius James Rich
The real split
between Arabs and Kurds started to took place in 1961, when the armed Kurdish
uprising began. Former Kurdish rebellions - particularly that of the Sheikh
Mahmud Barzanji, were against the occupier and feudal
and religious in nature. Followers of the history of Kurdish uprisings will
find that there were almost no significant Kurdish problems during the nearly
four decades of the Iraqi kingdom. The armed Kurdish revolt started in 1961,
which was the result of a conflict between capitalist and socialist camps, when
the Iraq
pro-Russian republican government was instituted,5
The ICG report recommends the
following:
•
That the
resolution of Kerkuk issues be postponed by ten years.
We wish to recall
the massive Human Rights violations of the predominant non-Kurdish communities
during the preceding five years, and to beg the following questions:
-
What will happen
if these regions remain under the control of Kurdish authorities which are
supported by Kurdish Peshmerga militia and totally politicized Kurdish security
services for 10 more years?
-
The Kurdish
authorities have already changed the demography of the Kerkuk province in the
past five years much more than that achieved by the Ba’ath regime in 30 years.
What will the state of the already extensive demographical changes in Kerkuk
province after 10 years?
•
Power sharing in
Kerkuk by the following percentages: 48 Kurds, 24 Turkmen, 24 arabs and 8 Chaldo-Assyrians.
There exist no valid reasons for
these percentages. It appears as though these figures were randomly extracted
from the results of the Iraqi December 2005 general election - an election that
was administered by the dominantly Kurdified administration in a sphere of
great instability – an election that lacked the most basic requirements to
qualify it as an election.
•
Kurdish
authorities to benefit from oil revenues
The report
incorrectly estimates the size of the oil reserves in the disputed regions as 13%
of Iraq’s
proven oil reserves. It is well known that Kerkuk reserves alone constitute
this figure. The other important oil fields in the region are Naftkhane in Khanaqin and Gayyara,
Ain Zalla in Mosul province. The fact,
which it seems the ICG and the western authorities deliberately ignore, is that
these regions have never been Kurdish regions, except after the extensive
Kurdish move toward the Khanaqin region, where they started to constitute the
majority after 1950s.
The question that
we put to the ICG regarding this point is at what price to non-Kurdish peoples
do these benefits to the Kurds com? The Kurdish authorities already receive
large revenue from the Iraqi budgets. The Iraqi census of 1957 puts the Kurdish
percentage in Iraq
at 13%. 17% is the politicized estimation of British military officers in Iraq. With the
massive political transfer Kurds to the ‘disputed regions’, the population size
of the Kurds in the 3 Kurdish provinces is surely less than 10% for which
Kurdish authorities receive 17% of the Iraqi budget.
The report doesn’t touch upon the
weaknesses in the constitution which are now becoming the center of controversy
nationally and internationally. The impractical status of the constitution, has
finally forced the top Iraqi authority, prime minister al-Maliki,
to ask for redrafting. But, the ICG sides with the Kurds in the aggressive
conflicts of the major constitutional disputes.
This would suggest that it supports Kurdish dominance of vast amounts of
Iraqi lands and considers as an advantage that:
“The Kurds would obtain demarcation and security guarantees
for their internal boundary with the rest of Iraq, as well as the right to
manage and profit from their own mineral wealth. Such a deal would codify the
significant gains the Kurds have made since they achieved limited autonomy in
the wake of the 1991 Gulf War and especially after April 2003”
The ICG report facilitates a well
known approach to Iraqi problems – coming across as a bystander allowing the
power holder Kurdish authorities impose their will. This approach lacks the
basic elements of justice. To be constructive, the western authorities should
openly investigate the major problems and present fair solutions. Accordingly
they should modify their policies with regards to the stakeholders. Nowadays,
despite the fact that Kurdish stakeholders play significant roles in the
problems which disturb reconciliation processes and threaten stability, the
western policy remains supportive of the Kurdish authorities increasing their inflexibility.
The ICG appears to consider the
disputed regions constitutionally Kurdish and seems to consider their practice
of politics in Baghdad
as type of a credit.
“Stymied in their quest to incorporate disputed territories
into the Kurdistan region by constitutional means, Kurdish leaders have signalled their intent to hold politics in Baghdad hostage to their demands”
In fact, whilst
the experiences of the past century made the authorities in regional countries
even more suspicious of the political loyalties of the Kurdish authorities,6 the experiences of the occupation years had
almost completely lost the trust of the Iraqi politicians and people to the
these authorities. Their behaviors and practices falsify their rarely verbal
claims about Iraqi patriotism. Today, even their many Shiite allies started to
feel that they have been deceived by the Kurdish authority’s exhibition of
partisanship.
The report seems to discredit the
power of the Iraqi government and policy makers to stifle Kurdish control and
tyranny in the Kerkuk and Diyala provinces.
“Two events in particular stand out: a two-month stalemate
in July-September in negotiations over a provincial elections law in which Kirkuk’s unresolved
status was the principal obstacle and, during this period, a campaign by the
Iraqi army in and around the Kurdish-controlled disputed district of Khanaqin”
This event represented an uprising
of policy makers against the rigid policy of Kurdish authorities and against
the attempts of Kurdish Parties to unfairly contain vast amounts of Iraqi
lands.
Contradictions in the ICG’s
messages on Kerkuk7
The current ICG report largely
conflicts with that of the 16 July 2006 report. One of the most disturbing aspects
of the ICG report is the recommendations for the Kerkuk administration. The
previous report recommended the redistributing of employment posts and
equitable power-sharing in several recommendations, whereas, the present report
proposes a dominant Kurdish control of the Kerkuk administration, reliant on
clearly unrealistic figures. The previous report asked for a respect to be
maintained for the red lines of all sides and regional countries, while the
present report completely ignores the non-ruling Iraqi communities and exposes
their lands to bargain. The July report admitted that the Kurdish
administration imposed its interests regarding the Kerkuk issue in the
constitution whereas the present report builds its recommendations on those
unfair gains. This report is based on restricted views and ignores the possible
role of other Iraqi stakeholders and representatives of civil society.
The unconstructive Kurdish policy
Despite the fact that Kurdish
actors were given certain privilege in the Iraqi constitution which meant a
distorted balance of power – they continue to violate the Iraqi
constitution. The drafting of the Iraqi
constitution was not transparent – and was at times dishonest.8 The classification of
the Iraqi people into two categories in article 4 was an idea imposed by
Kurdish political parties. The Kurdish regional government violates the
federalism law and disregards the central government. Today, Kurds rule their
region almost independently, disproportionally sharing in the administration of
the Iraq
and controlling the Iraqi legislative mechanism on two levels. The failure to
normalize the Kerkuk region is due to the rigid policy of the Kurdish
authorities. They are inflexible in all their demands.
Since the
occupation the dominant non-Kurdish population of the ‘disputed regions’ is
continuously exposed to intimidation, assimilation processes an oppression. The
demography of the region was changed by the transfer of hundreds of thousands
of Kurds from other Kurdish regions and the north eastern mountainous regions
of Iraq.
The forged elections which were administered by ‘Kurdified’ administrations
have legalized the false Kurdish nature of the region in the eyes of the
international community. In such chaotic circumstances the ICG demands the
bargain of land and urges the UNAMI to proceed with deciding the fate of the
vast Iraqi lands.
The so-called the disputed regions
These vast
regions, on which the ICG bases its report – an area which they effectively
expose to ‘bargain’ - have no official definition. It roughly comprises 10% of Iraqi lands inhabited by
about 3 million predominantly non-Kurdish Iraqi indigenous populations
including Arabs. These regions were occupied by Kurdish Peshmerga militias
after occupation and the administration was severely ‘Kurdified’.
The criteria upon
which the UNAMI relied when drafting its first report in July characterized by
unfair approach when it came to Turkmen regions:
•
Historically
Turkmen cities which have been recently ‘Kurdified’ were not included in the UNAMI’s list of disputed regions. Erbil,
Kifri and Khanaqin were predominantly Turkmen regions at the turn of the latter
century. Turkmen constituted the majority in the middle of the same century.
•
Some regions,
like Telafer, have never included even a small percentage of Kurds. The Turkmen
are still dominant in the administration of these areas. It is unfairly listed
in the UNAMI’s list of the disputed regions.
•
Huge
demographical changes in disputed regions, which were influenced by Kurdish authorities,
were not taken in the consideration.
Conclusion
The report of the
ICG is bereft of any meaningful bargain ideas; it recommends:
•
The continuation
of the present almost absolute Kurdish control of the Kerkuk province for
another 10 years.
•
a Kurdish hegemony
of the administration in Kerkuk.
•
an oil advantage
for the Kurds
In fact the
report of the ICG is based on the following Iraqi proverb:
•
If you want the
rabbit, you should have the rabbit
•
If you want the
gazelle, you should have the rabbit
Such a report:
•
Encourages an
inflexible Kurdish policy, which further worsens the schism between Kurds on
one side, and other Iraqi communities on the other side, making conflict
unavoidable
•
Consolidates
Kurdish supremacy on the central government.
•
Fails to
acknowledge the tactics of land grabbing from Kurdish tribal leaders - even in
neighboring countries
•
Benefits the
continuation of Kurdish hegemony and the oppression of millions of Iraqis in
the ‘disputed regions’ of which the majority are Iraqi indigenous populations
who have been discriminated against for decades
The report
presents unverified information, unbalanced and unconstructive proposals. It
consequently exposes an impartial attitude on the reporter and International
Crisis Group.
How to proceed:
•
The international community should not endeavor to force the
Iraqi government to solve the federalism law issues or other issues with
Kurdish parties. It is well known that almost all state administration systems in
Iraqi were destroyed after the occupation. The most important point is now that
all expert units of the Iraqi state be built upon. To
function properly these units need experience - this means that the Iraqi state
needs time to be developed and to function properly. Therefore, attempts of
Kurdish parties to force the Iraqi government or the international authorities
to solve such crucial national problems in a short period of time should be
rejected.
•
As the institution of boundaries on ethnic or religious
bases is impossible in the North of Iraq, due to the facts that:
o
The ethnic and the religious communities are significantly
mixed.
o
The demography of the region has been continuously and
greatly exposed to alteration in recent history.
The introduction of federal system based
on the ethnicity or religion to the region should greatly be avoided.
•
If Kurdish authorities, disregarding all the other Iraqi
communities, Arabs, Turkmen, Chaldo-Assyrians, Shabaks and Yazidis, insist on a
federal region based on Kurdish ethnicity, the following points should be
considered:
-
Kurdification
processes which have been introduced since the occupation should be corrected.
-
The continuous
and huge Kurdish transfer to Northern Iraq
since 19009 - a process which has
greatly altered the demography of great parts of the territory - should be
studied carefully by academic history experts.
International legal bodies should also investigate the Kurdish right to develop
federal regions on vast amounts of Iraqi land, which was spontaneously and/or
politically Kurdified in the 20th century, based on their ethnicity.
•
To eliminate the population’s fear and vulnerability to
intimidation, persecution, annihilation and deprivation of work, the civil,
security and military administrations of the so-called disputed regions should
be maintained by neutral or independent authorities.
•
Whilst the world was fully engaged in addressing general
human rights abuses in Iraq
for 5 years, intensive demographical changes and aggressive violations of human
rights took place in Northern Iraq by the
Kurdish Peshmerge militants and politicized security service. To document these
events and revert the demographical changes and improve the human rights
situation, the United Nations:
-
Should increase
the number of offices and staff it has inside Iraq, particularly in the disputed
regions.10
-
Should publish
twice monthly or monthly reports on the Human rights situation in the disputed
regions.
•
The international community, particularly the USA and
European authorities should actively participate in the realization of the
abovementioned steps. On these bases they should either provide or withhold
their assistance and cooperation.
•
Western policy makers should attempt to approach ethnic
issues in Northern Iraq with a more neutral
attitude.
•
Self interest should put aside when western authorities
actively participate in addressing these issues of high importance in Iraq.
________________________________________
Reference:
1.
CNN.com, “Rice: Thousands of errors
in Iraq“,
April 1, 2006.
http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/europe/03/31/rice.straw.liverpool/index.html
2.
Is this not a
clear confession? These mistakes killed hundreds of thousands Iraqis. Is it not
a legal case? Should it not be treated in the International Criminal Court?
Questions should be considered by the United Nations organs and International
Human Rights authorities.
3.
Michael Morony, “Iraq after the Muslim Conquest”, Princeton
university press, Priceton,
New Jersey, 1984, P. 265
4.
Claudius James
Rich, “Residence in Koordistan”, (Printed by Anton Hain KG, Meisenheim / Glan, West Germany; Republished in 1972 by Gregg
International Limited West mead, Farnborough, Hants, England 1972), Vol. I, P.
33
5.
Phebe Marr, “The Modern
History of Iraq”,
Westview Press, 1985, P. 164 – 167.
http://www.turkmen.nl/1A_Others/Marr.doc
6.
Hakan Ozoglu, “Kurdish Notables and the Ottoman State:
Evolving Identities, Competing Loyalties, and Shifting Boundaries”, SUNY Press,
2004, P. 3
7.
Middle East Report
Number 56 of the International Crisis Group, “Iraq
and the Kurds: The Brewing Battle over Kirkuk”,
18 July 2006, http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4267&l=1
8.
The presence of
the word “current” in the article 110 with the sentence of the article 111
points clearly to an attempt to mislead each other. These two articles give
indirect and enclosed rights for federal region to exploit freely the new
fields.
“Article
(110): 1st - The federal government will administer oil and gas extracted from current fields in
cooperation with the governments of the producing regions and provinces on condition
that the revenues will be distributed fairly in a manner compatible with the
demographical distribution all over the country”
“Article
(111): All that is not written in the exclusive powers of the federal
authorities is in the authority of the regions”
9.
Article by SOITM,
“To the participants in seeking a solution to the Kerkuk problem: The
historical anatomy of Kerkuk region”, 29, November 2008:
http://www.turkmen.nl/1A_soitm/art.30-K2908.htm
10.
Worth noting that until recently
the United Nations had 2 offices inside Iraq
one in Baghdad and another in Erbil,
before few months the Kerkuk office was instituted. Number of the staffs of
United Nations who work on the human rights situation inside Iraq is 41. In
addition to its budget, the United Nations office in Baghdad utilizes large sums of money from
different international authorities, for example, European Union. How
effectively such a small office achieve its implications should be carefully
investigated.